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I. INTRODUCTION
As the number of failed farm and ranch operations increases,
so does the number of lawsuits involving claims that lenders are
responsible for farmers' losses. These lawsuits are precipitated by
what the farmer perceives to be a sudden refusal to extend addi-
tional credit, a sudden acceleration of a loan or an unexpected re-
fusal to renew credit. The theories farmers assert against farm
lenders range from breach of contract to breach of an implied cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing. These claims generally arise in
one of two forms: a direct action by the farmer against a lender or
a counterclaim to the lender's foreclosure suit. Because there are a
limited number of reported cases that analyze the sudden or unex-
pected termination of farm credit, courts are struggling to develop
standards against which to evaluate a lender's conduct.
Perhaps the most publicized case involving farm liability is
Jewell v. Bank of America.1 In Jewell, the jury awarded $22 mil-
lion for punitive damages to apple farmers who claimed they were
injured by the sudden termination of credit by Bank of America.2
1. No. 112439 (Superior Ct. of Cal., Co. of Sonoma 1985). This case is under appeal.
2. Jewell alleged that he was encouraged by the Bank of America to loan funds to his
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The trial court reduced the punitive damages to $5 million and let
the award of $17 million in general damages stand.' The Jewell
case is not alone. An Iowa jury awarded an Iowa farmer $1.5 mil-
lion in damages and ordered the lender to forgive an additional
$645,000 of indebtedness as a result of alleged false promises of
new loans." In states such as Montana, where the state supreme
court has implied a covenant of good faith and fair dealing into a
wide variety of contracts, counterclaims against banks in foreclo-
sure actions alleging breach of the implied covenant are now as-
serted almost as a matter of course. These suits and counterclaims
represent a real threat to banks in farm communities, 5 many of
which are already in a weakened condition.
The increase in the number of lawsuits against farm lenders 6
is attributable, in part, to the changing attitude of farm lenders
toward farm operations. Until the farm crisis of the 1980s, many
lenders rushed to make loans to farmers. Farm lenders often paid
employees bonuses based on loan volume initiated. One way lend-
ers initiated new loans was to build a reputation that the lender
would stand behind the farmer through "thick and thin.' ' 7 Lenders
customer, James E. O'Connell Co., to pay the customer's anxious creditors. Jewell borrowed
$150,000 from the Bank of America over a period of time to help O'Connell, based on a
bank officer's agreement to "take care of the debts" by refinancing the loan later. Jewell
claimed Bank of America later disclosed that it considered management skills to be inade-
quate. Jewell's loan to keep O'Connell afloat, according to the evidence, ultimately benefit-
ted Bank of America since O'Connell's largest creditor was a Bank of America customer.
This fact was never disclosed to Jewell. For a discussion of the Jewell case, see Bahls &
Bahls, Farmers Fight Back, FARM J., Mid-January 1987 at 21; Hidas, Apple Wars, SONOMA
Bus., Summer 1986 at 84; Lehrman & Ludlow, Financially Ailing Farmers Take Their Bat-
tle to the Courtroom, San Francisco Examiner, March 19, 1986 1, col. 1; Levine, An Apple
Grower Takes a Bite out of B of A, Bus. WK., November 11, 1985, at 114.
3. Hidas, supra note 2, at 93.
4. Levine, supra note 2, at 114. For a discussion of other leading cases, see Miller,
Lawyers Who Cash in on Lender Liability, BANKERS MONTHLY, October 1986 at 19.
5. One bankers' magazine reports that the "threat" of lender liability "is sending chills
down many a banker's spine." Stuart, Lender Liability, U.S. BANKER, May 1986, at 10. See
also, Bahls & Bahls, supra note 2, at 21; Moss, Borrowers Fight Back With Lender Liabil-
ity, 73 A.B.A.J. 5, 9 (March 1, 1981). The law concerning lender liability, according to one
commentator, shows "signs of a truly glacial shift in the complex that constitutes the bank-
customer relationship." Counsel's Corner, 104 BANKING L.J. 59, 59 (1987).
6. The Federal Revenue Board estimates that the farm real estate debt, in 1985, was
held by the following groups: Farm Credit System, 44.04%, insurance companies, 11.02%,
banks, 9.01%, Farmers Home Administration, 8.87%, individuals and others, 26.79%. See
Farm Credit Administration Act Amendments of 1985, Before the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing, Housing and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 50 (1986) (statement of Randall A.
Killebrew).
7. Kelley, Some Observations on Lender Liability and Representing the Farmer/Bur-
rower, AGRIc. L. UPDATE, December 1986, at 4, 5. One bank newspaper advertisement stated:
"We don't take a 'lend you and leave you' attitude toward our customers." See The Bank
Customer Relation: Part II - The Judicial Decisions, 100 BANKING L.J. 325, 327 (1983).
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often became the farmer's friend and financial adviser, sometimes
encouraging the farmer to expand his business. As the farm crisis
worsened, farmers' relationships with their lenders changed. Lend-
ers stopped advancing money to expand operations and frequently
conditioned new loans on a restructuring of the farm operation and
farm debt.8 Some lenders asked for additional security or required
partial liquidation of operations as a condition of extending future
credit. Farmers and ranchers were understandably dismayed at the
relatively sudden change in the bankers' attitude. Eventually many
lenders chose to minimize their losses by foreclosing and farmers
and ranchers retaliated with suits against the lenders.
There are no clear standards to guide the judicial system when
it must determine whether a lender is liable, when the lender, who
has been willing (and eager) to make loans in the past, terminates
credit relatively suddenly.9 Attorneys pursuing these claims use a
number of theories, which commonly include: breach of contract,
fraud, interference with contract, negligence and breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith.10 Courts struggle with these causes of
action because of lack of precedent and because the breakdown of
relationships between farm lenders and farmers does not always fit
neatly into one of these causes of action.
This article describes the primary theories of liability asserted
against lenders by farmers when credit is terminated. The discus-
sion focuses on the difficulty that courts have with balancing vary-
ing interests of the borrower in fair treatment by the lenders and
of the lender in making credit decisions (including decisions to ter-
minate credit) in such a way as to benefit their owners." This arti-
Claims that lenders solicited the farmers' business are not uncommon. See, e.g., Wait v.
First Midwest Bank/Danville, 142 Ill. App. 3d 703, 705, 491 N.E.2d 795, 798 (1986).
8. Kelly, supra note 5 at 4, 5. The banks' hesitancy to extend credit was due to a
worsening of the farm economy. World recession, United States trade policies (including the
grain embargo of the Soviet Union), increased acreage in food production, increased produc-
tion and debt service costs, and United States government farm policies all served to make
farming less profitable. See U.S. Dep't of Agric. Econ. Research Serv., Reviving U.S. Ex-
ports: Why Is It Taking So Long, FARMLINE, Feb. 1985 at 15-18.
9. For a good discussion of theories used by bank borrower, see Ebke & Griffin,
Lender Liability to Debtors: Toward a Conceptual Framework, 40 Sw. L.J. 775 (1986), and
Flick, II & Replansky, Liability of Banks to Their Borrowers: Pitfalls and Protections, 113
BANK. L.J. 220 (1986).
In states such as Montana, a spirited debate rages among the members of the Montana
Supreme Court concerning what circumstances justify imposition of bank liability. North-
western Nat. Bank v. Weaver-Maxwell, Inc., - Mont. 729 P.2d 1258, 1267-68
(1987) (Morrison, J., dissenting).
10. Ebke & Griffin, supra note 9.
11. The burden of bank failures, whether due to judgments against banks for "foul
play" or the inability to collect their loans will ultimately rest on the American public be-
cause most banks are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
[Vol. 48
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cle then suggests standards against which to measure a lender's
and borrower's conduct in order to determine whether a contract
to extend or renew credit exists and whether the lender has com-
mitted any of the numerous varieties of fraud against the bor-
rower. The article describes two theories asserted against lenders
which are only beginning to develop: (a) negligence in processing a
borrower's applications for loan renewals and (b) breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when lenders termi-
nate or fail to extend new credit. After a discussion of policy con-
siderations, the article concludes that decisions to accelerate an
existing loan should be treated differently than applications to ex-
tend new or additional credit when loans are due and unpaid. The
decision to accelerate a loan because of a default in its terms
should be evaluated against an objective good faith standard, while
the decision to refuse to extend new or additional credit should not
be measured against an objective good faith standard; rather, it
should only be tested to determine whether a contract to extend
credit exists or whether the bank has committed one of several va-
rieties of fraud. In most events, however, the lenders should be ex-
pected to give borrowers reasonable notice of their intended ac-
tions. This article discusses why these standards represent a
reasonable balance between the borrower's need for fair treatment
and the lender's need to return a reasonable profit to its
shareholders.
II. THEORIES COMMONLY ASSERTED
A borrower who suffers a sudden termination of credit fre-
quently asserts more than one theory against the lender. Usually
one of the theories is based in contract and the other is based in
tort.12 Both contract and tort theories will be analyzed.
A. Contract Theories
The statements and conduct of the borrower and lender prior
to the due date of a loan may amount to a contract to refinance the
existing debt when it becomes due or may give rise to a modifica-
tion of the loan that extends the due date of the loan. When the
borrower and lender do not agree whether a contract to extend
12. See, e.g., Betterton v. First Interstate Bank, 800 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1986); Alaska
Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983); Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of Am., 38 Cal. 3d
892, 701 P.2d 826, 215 Cal. Rptr. 679 (i985); Wait v. First Midwest Bank/Danville, 142 Ill.
App. 3d 703, 491 N.E.2d 795 (1986); Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Weaver-Maxwell, Inc.,
- Mont. -, 729 P.2d 1258 (1987); Central Bank v. Eystad, - Mont. -, 710 P.2d
710 (1985); First Nat'l Mont. Bank v. McGuiness, - Mont. -, 705 P.2d 579 (1985).
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credit was made, the lender typically argues that it merely entered
into negotiations, while the borrower argues that there was an offer
and acceptance which amounted to a binding contract.
Alaska Statebank v. Fairco1 3 is typical of the cases which dis-
cuss whether a bank officer's words and actions amount to an offer
to extend the due date of a note. In Fairco, a retail shop failed to
make a bank payment when it was due. The borrowers requested
that the bank extend the due date of the note until after the
Christmas season. There was conflicting testimony between the
bank and the borrower about the conversations which took place
concerning the extension of the due date. The supreme court noted
the lower court's finding that the borrower left the meeting with
the "impression" that the due date of the note was extended and
affirmed the lower court's finding that "[t]he parties had agreed to
such a modification, '[g]iven the course of dealings between the
parties, the fact of the continued negotiation and the lack of out-
standing demand for payment'.""' The Alaska Supreme Court's
conclusion may be criticized as a jumbled legal analysis. By exam-
ining the course of dealing and absence of demand and then con-
cluding that the contract is modified, the court fails to focus on the
critical elements necessary to modify a contract. As explained be-
low, an analysis of course of dealing and conduct of the lender is
more appropriate when testing the lender's actions for fraud or es-
toppel.15 Unfortunately, the Alaska Supreme Court is not alone in
misanalyzing whether the borrower's and lender's conduct is suffi-
cient to create a contract. While the improper analysis may be at-
tributable to the lack of precedent in loan extension cases, courts
should adhere to certain basic tenets of contract law described be-
low when evaluating each case.
To properly analyze whether a contract action may be main-
tained against a bank when credit is terminated, three separate
questions must be analyzed:
(1) Did the lender and borrower agree to an extension of new
credit or a refinancing of existing credit?
2) Did the lender agree to modify the loan agreement in such
a way as to extend the due date?
3) Did the lender waive its right to insist on timely payments
13. 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983).
14. Id. at 292.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 31-44 & 59-69. Course of dealing is also appro-
priately analyzed to supply missing terms or disputed terms or to supplement or qualify the
terms of the agreement, but not to supply offer and assent to a modification. E. FARNS-
WORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 7.13 at 508, & 3.28 at 196 (1982).
218 [Vol. 48
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or is the lender estopped from insisting on timely payments?
If courts use this three-step analysis, their decisions will avoid
muddled analysis of cases such as Fairco and will provide for
greater certainty for both lenders and borrowers. This section dis-
cusses each of these questions, but does not attempt to describe
thoroughly the elements necessary to make out a cause of action.
Rather this section of the article focuses on the contract arguments
which commonly arise in disputes which occur as a result of the
bank's failure to extend credit.
1. Commitment for New Financing or New Credit
It is common for lenders and borrowers to engage in a discus-
sion of whether a lender will refinance an existing loan and, per-
haps, extend additional credit. If there is an agreement to refi-
nance a loan or extend new credit, a borrower may properly sue for
contract damages when the credit is not forthcoming. If the parties
agree that the lender will make a loan or extend the due date of
the loan and agree the "details" will be worked out later, there is
an issue as to whether the terms of the agreement are sufficiently
definite to justify a finding that the parties assented to the con-
tract. In order to be sufficiently definite, the terms of the contract
must "provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach
and for giving an appropriate remedy.""6 Courts have held that for
an agreement to loan money in the future to be sufficiently en-
forceable, there must be agreement on the material terms of the
loan, including the due date(s), the interest rate, and the mode and
rate of payment.1 7 Some courts have found that these elements
need only be proven with reasonable certainty.18 For example, in
Wait v. First Midwest Bank/Danville,19 an Illinois Court of Ap-
peals found that an interest rate was sufficiently definite when the
parties agreed that it was "at the variable rate [then] charged" and
that duration could be established "based upon custom in the area,
the terms of the previous loan . . . or in considering the steps [the
borrower] alleges he has taken to obtain the loan."' While courts
have not required definite proof of every term of the contract,
courts correctly require the party asserting the existence of the
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2) (1981).
17. Wait v. First Midwest Bank/Danville, 142 Ill. App. 3d 703, 708, 491 N.E.2d 795,
801 (1986); McErlean v. Union Nat'l Bank, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1141, 1146, 414 N.E.2d 128, 132
VJ. .
18. See, e.g., Wait, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 708, 491 N.E.2d at 801.
19. 142 Ill. App. 3d 703, 491 N.E.2d 795.
20. Id. at 708-09, 491 N.E.2d at 801.
1987] 219
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contract to prove the major terms described in the Wait case. Fi-
nally, some courts have held that agreements that are "firm" but
subject to "more definitive documentation" are not sufficiently def-
inite to be enforceable.2
Because of the requirement of assent, courts should resist the
temptation to find that, because the lender has extended credit in
the past and then terminated credit without warning, it has there-
fore agreed to modify the contract to provide for a new due date.
This does not amount to the necessary assent. Renewing credit in
the past does not mean that one necessarily intends to renew
credit indefinitely. The course of past dealing should not amount
to sufficient assent to continue dealing, indefinitely, in that way
when there is a clear due date expressed in the loan. It is well es-
tablished that if the course of dealing (a pattern of renewal) is in-
consistent with a written term (a specific due date of the loan), the
evidence of course of dealing is not relevant.2 2 Rather, the course
of dealing may be properly examined to interpret the terms of the
modification and may be examined to supplement or qualify the
terms of the modification,23 but not whether there is assent to a
modification. As properly noted by the Kansas Supreme Court,
"the mere fact that a bank has renewed loans in the past does not
require it to do so in the future."2 '
2. Modification of the Loan Agreements
To modify a loan agreement, or any other contract, three ele-
ments must be present: assent, a writing (if the contract falls
within the Statute of Frauds), and consideration or detrimental re-
liance.25 Of these elements, most of the litigation surrounds the is-
sue of assent. Usually borrowers avoid a Statute of Frauds problem
because the claimed extension is a year or less. Usually the defense
of lack of consideration is not a viable argument because prior debt
is often sufficient consideration. 6 In the typical case, the lender
has extended credit a number of times and has entered into negoti-
21. J. Russell Flowers, Inc. v. Itel Corp., 495 F. Supp. 88 (N.D. Miss. 1980).
22. See generally E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, § 7.13 at 512. Evidence of course of
dealing may be relevant when determining whether the lender's conduct is tortious.
23. Id. at §§ 3.28 at 196 & 7.13 at 508. As previously stated, course of dealing, when
used in the context of the Fairco case is more properly examined under theories of fraud
and estoppel. See text accompanying notes 11 through 14 supra.
24. First Bank v. Moden, 235 Kan. 260, 264, 681 P.2d 11, 14 (1984).
25. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, § 8.5 at 562-63.
26. Farmers State Bank v. Johnson, 188 Mont. 55, 62, 610 P.2d 1172, 1176 (1980). See
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ations to extend credit again. There is usually a dispute as to
whether the lender, by its words or acts, modified the due date.
In order for assent to be sufficient to provide a basis for modi-
fication, the terms of the modification must be sufficiently defi-
nite. When the issue is whether an extension of the due date of a
loan is sufficiently definite, courts require a definite and certain
time or a time computed with reference to a specific event.28
Courts should not find that the term of the note has been extended
to some indefinite date unless it is clearly the intent of the parties
to convert the note to a demand note that requires a definite pe-
riod of notice before payment is due.
In some states, such as Montana, a showing of oral assent to a
modification will not be effective because of the statute providing
written contracts cannot be modified except in writing or by an
executed oral agreement. 29 These states, however, are in the minor-
ity and their statutes are inconsistent with common law."0 In states
with the minority rule, the issue then is not whether the lender's
oral statements or actions serve to modify the loan, but whether
the lender has waived certain rights under the loan or is estopped
from asserting certain rights because of prior actions or
statements.
3. Waiver/Estoppel Theories
Because it is frequently difficult for borrowers to prove the
necessary facts to constitute assent to extend the due date, borrow-
ers often rely on theories of waiver or estoppel to achieve the same
result. When a lender accepts late payments on a note, the lender
waives its right to accelerate payments due on the note or foreclose
against the collateral supporting the note as a result of the late
payments it accepted. 1 The waiver is usually effective even though
the contract calling for the payments contains a clause that "time
is of the essence"32 or an anti-waiver clause. 3 Courts deciding
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2) (1981).
28. Tsesmelis v. Sinton State Bank, 53 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. Ct. App. 1932); Keller v.
Commercial Credit Co., 149 Or. 372, 40 P.2d 1018 (1935); and Pavey v. Collins, 31 Wash. 2d
864, 199 P.2d 571 (1948). Courts may, however, review circumstances outside the four cor-
ners of the loan agreements to determine the due date the parties intended. See Carrico v.
Delp, 141 Ill. App. 3d 737, 490 N.E.2d 977 (1986).
29. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-1602 (1985). See Winkel v. Family Health Care,
Mont. -, 668 P.2d 208 (1983).
30. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, § 7.6 at 474.
31. Suburban Homes Co. v. North, 50 Mont. 108, 145 P. 2 (1914). The result in the
Suburban Homes case was recently confirmed in Bailey v. Lilly, Mont. -, 667 P.2d
933 (1983).
32. Suburban Homes Co., 50 Mont. 108, 145 P. 2.
19871
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these cases properly reason that a lender, by its conduct, may
waive its "time is of the essence clause" or anti-waiver clause.
A related and more difficult question, is whether a lender who
establishes a pattern of accepting late payments has "waived" its
right to insist on future timely payments or has consented to an
extension of the due date of future payments. The argument in
support of this position is that the indulgence of the lender in not
insisting on, and enforcing, timely payments is evidence of an
agreement that the borrower's failure to make timely payment is
not a default." Many courts hold that if a pattern of accepting late
payments is established, lenders may not insist on strict compli-
ance with the terms of the contract.3 6 These courts find that be-
cause this course of conduct by the lenders lulls debtors into a
habit of making late payments, it is inequitable to require timely
payments without reasonable advance notice of the lenders' inten-
tions to do so. 6 What constitutes reasonable advance notice has
not been defined. Presumably, the notice must have been given a
sufficient amount of time before the payment is due to enable a
creditworthy borrower an adequate opportunity to find alternative
financing.
Waiver of a lender's right to insist on timely payments, under
certain circumstances, may be a proper defense to a lender's action
to declare a default and subsequent acceleration of a note when an
installment payment is not made on time. It is not, however, a
proper argument to justify requiring a lender to extend a note
which is already due. Waiver is not "the intentional relinquish-
ment of a known right," as it is often said to be. 37 Rather, it is the
excuse of the nonoccurrence or a delay of a condition. The failure
to declare a default (within a condition of a loan) is different from
the failure to renew a loan. A loan is properly renewed by a sepa-
rate contract, not by the mere waiver of a default in an existing
33. Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Shelton, 645 F.2d 869, 873 (10th Cir. 1981); Smith v.
General Fin. Corp., 243 Ga. 500, 501, 255 S.E.2d 14, 15 (1979); Van Bibber v. Norris, 404
N.E.2d 1365, 1373-74 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Cobb v. Midwest Recovery Bureau Co., 295
N.W.2d 232, 237 (Minn. 1980); contra Hale v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 374 So. 2d 849, 853
(Ala. 1979); Fair v. General Fin. Corp., 147 Ga. App. 706, 250 S.E.2d 9 (1978); Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Middlesboro Motor Sales, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Ky. Ct. App.
1968); Home Fin. Co. v. Frazier, 380 S.W.2d 91, 93 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964).
34. A similar analysis was used in Suburban Homes, 50 Mont. at 118, 145 P. at 5.
35. Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Shelton, 645 F.2d 869, 873 (10th Cir. 1981); Nevada
Nat'l Bank v. Huff, 94 Nev. 506, 513, 582 P.2d 364, 369 (1978); Knittel v. Security State
Bank, 593 P.2d 92, 95-96 (Okla. 1979); Lee v. Wood Prod. Credit Union, 275 Or. 445, 448,
551 P.2d 446, 448 (1976).
36. Lee v. Wood Prod. Credit Union, 275 Or. 445, 448, 551 P.2d 446, 448 (1976).
37. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, § 8.5 at 561.
[Vol. 48
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 48 [1987], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol48/iss2/1
1987] LENDER LIABILITY 223
contract.
Closely related to the theory of waiver is the theory of equita-
ble estoppel. s8 Borrowers have successfully used the theory of equi-
table estoppel to preclude lenders from taking actions inconsist-. ent
with their oral statements in states that provide that written
agreements may not be orally modified. The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma properly applied the theory of estoppel to a bank which
had orally waived a default as defined by the loan agreement.3 9
Oklahoma is a state, like Montana, that provides that a contract in
writing may only be altered in writing or by an executed oral
agreement.40 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma found that a bank
was estopped from exercising its right to accelerate because the
bank officer's statement assured the debtor that late payment was
not considered to be a default. The court, quoting the Supreme
Court of Utah, held:
The imposition of such severe conditions [as acceleration upon
default] is not favored in the law; and one who seeks to impose
them must not, either by acts or omission permit another to as-
sume that the covenant will not be strictly enforced, then "crack
down" on the obligor by rigidly insisting on enforcement, without
giving some reasonable notice and opportunity to comply.
4 1
It would seem that the rationale set forth by the Supreme Court of
Utah not only applies to accelerations of notes upon defaults, but
38. The elements of equitable estoppel are best described in 2 J. POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 804 (4th ed. 1918), which provides:
Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby
he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which
might perhaps have otherwise existed, either of property, of contract, or of rem-
edy, as against another person, who has in good faith relied on such conduct, and
has been led thereby to change his position for the worse, and who on his part
acquires some corresponding right, either of property, of contract, or of remedy.
The concept of estoppel is frequently used by courts to allow recovery when there has
been no offer because of insufficient definiteness. See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis.
2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965). Commentators have criticized applying the notion of prom-
issory estoppel to cases where there is no offer and have suggested that decisions "may fit
better into that field of liability for blameworthy conduct that we know as tort, instead of
that field of liability based on obligations voluntarily assumed that we call contract." E.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, § 3.26 at 192. Farnsworth's criticism of using a promissory
estoppel notion to prevent injustice when there is not a definite promise (e.g., the lender
agrees to extend the loan to some unspecified due date) is appropriate in light of the well
developed body of law relating to misrepresentation. When the issue of the sudden termina-
tion of credit is examined, often the borrower was aggrieved by what the borrower views as a
misrepresentation of the bank's intent, but not by a definite offer to the borrower.
39. Knittel v. Security State Bank, 593 P.2d 92, 95 (Okla. 1979).
40. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 237 (West 1966).
41. Knittel, 593 P.2d at 96 (quoting Williamson v. Wanless, 545 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Utah
1976)).
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also to statements whereby the lender consents to postpone the
due date of the note. If a borrower, reasonably relying on these
statements, fails to refinance elsewhere, the lender should be es-
topped from asserting the loan is due.2
Once it is determined that the issue is one of waiver or estop-
pel, the court must be careful to examine whether, in fact, the
lender took actions to induce a borrower to believe credit would be
extended or a default waived and whether the borrower was rea-
sonable in relying on such belief.4 3 Mere discussions of an exten-
sion of credit or even past renewals of credit should not lead a
borrower to reasonably believe that credit be will extended or re-
newed again and again. At most, the reasonable borrower would be
led to believe that credit will not be terminated without reasonable
notice. To justify the borrower's reliance, the statements should be
sufficiently definite to lead the borrower to believe that a binding
commitment has been made.
An example of the proper application of the doctrine of equi-
table estoppel is the Kansas case of First Bank of Wakeeney v.
Moden.4 In this case, the bank had renewed credit a number of
times. The borrowers alleged that at the time the loan was last
renewed, they gave the bank a "farm plan" detailing anticipated
operations. The borrowers argued that the bank was obligated to
continue extending credit because they successfully operated
within the farm plan. The court rejected their contention that the
lender was estopped from foreclosing. The court held that the bor-
rowers failed to show any misrepresentation (receiving the farm
plan was not tantamount to a representation that the loan would
be extended if it was carried out) or reliance on a representation
(borrowers were not induced to believe that, regardless of their
ability to pay, the loan would be extended if the farm plan was
carried out). 5
4. Issues of Loan Officer's Authority
If a borrower is successful in demonstrating that an officer or
employee of the lender entered into an agreement to extend credit,
there is an issue as to whether that agreement is binding on the
bank. This issue is particularly difficult when the employee or of-
ficer did not have actual authority to bind a bank because either
approval of a loan committee or senior bank official was needed. In
42. See the analysis in Becker v. Becker, 250 Ill. 177, 95 N.E. 70 (1911).
43. See Iola State Bank v. Biggs, 233 Kan. 450, 662 P.2d 563 (1983).
44. 235 Kan. 260, 681 P.2d 11 (1984).
45. Id. at 264-65, 681 P.2d at 14-15.
[Vol. 48
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the absence of actual authority, the issue is whether the officer is
able to bind the lender to a contract with the borrower by virtue of
an officer's apparent authority. In order for the officer to have ap-
parent authority to bind the lender, the lender must (a) conduct
itself in a way that leads the borrower to believe that officer has
authority to bind the lender and (b) the borrower's belief must be
reasonable." In most cases when a bank appoints an individual to
the position of loan officer, the bank's actions imply that the indi-
vidual so appointed has all of the authority which loan officers cus-
tomarily have. The more difficult issue is whether it is reasonable
for the customer to believe that the loan officer has the authority
to make loan commitments without approval.47 It would be well to
look at the business customs of the community in each case. In
rural communities, it is not uncommon for some bank officers (who
may be owner of the bank) to have sufficient status with any loan
committee that it is reasonable for the borrower to believe that the
decision of the officer will be the decision of the loan committee.
With larger banks, especially when the customer has a history of
dealing with the bank, it may not be reasonable to expect the loan
officer to have authority to commit to a loan, without approval of
others. 48
B. Fraud Theories
All jurisdictions recognize that if a bank commits a fraud
against a borrower, the bank is liable for the borrower's damages
and, in certain cases, for punitive damages also. Courts disagree,
however, as to what constitutes fraud by a lender. This section ex-
amines the major categories of fraud asserted by borrowers against
lenders. When fraud is discussed in this article, most of the discus-
sion will involve the tort action for deceit or misrepresentation.
While contract law provides that contracts may be voided because
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 (1958). See Bank of N.C. v. Rock Island
Bank, 630 F.2d 1243, 1251-52 (7th Cir. 1980); Kraus v. Treasure Belt Mining Co., 146 Mont.
432, 435, 408 P.2d 151, 152 (1965). For a good discussion of a bank officer's apparent author-
ity to commit to a loan, see Banker's Trust Co. v. Steenburn, 95 Misc. 2d 967, -, 409
N.Y.S.2d 51, 67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
47. The promise to extend additional credit or extend the due date of the note is
different from a promise to forgive all as part of the debt. Several cases have held that a
bank officer does not have the authority to release debtors from their obligations. See Rog-
ers v. First State Bank, 79 Colo. 84, 243 P. 637 (1926); Central Republic Trust Co. v. Evans,
378 Ill. 58, 37 N.E.2d 745 (1941); Mt. Vernon Trust Co. v. Bergoff, 272 N.Y. 192, 5 N.E.2d
196 (1936). The rationale behind these cases is that agreement to forgive debt would operate
as a fraud on depositors and regulatory authorities. The agreement to extend due date, how-
ever, is a much less drastic step and would not rise to that level of fraud.
48. See Banker's Trust Co., 95 Misc. 2d at - , 409 N.Y.S.2d at 67.
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of fraud or misrepresentation, tort fraud is most often asserted be-
cause the borrower is not seeking to void the transaction and is not
seeking restitution,49 but is seeking damages as a result of the ter-
mination of credit. Borrowers who have lost the farm as a result of
the lender's fraud will be less interested in restitution (which fo-
cuses on what the lender gained) than in tort damages."
1. Garden Variety Fraud
Courts have little difficulty holding lenders liable for terminat-
ing credit if the termination of credit involves some type of "gar-
den variety fraud." For the purpose of this article, garden variety
frauds are fraud where there is clear evidence that a bank made
misrepresentations or took action which violated the law in order
to gain an advantage over the borrower. These cases usually in-
volve malice, willful action, oppression or other aggravating cir-
cumstances. Cases involving fraud typically fall into several
categories:
(1) offsetting a deposit account against a loan where the off-
set is not permitted by law;5"
(2) physically altering the terms of a promissory note or other
lending documents;52
(3) threats of foreclosure, when the lender has no right to
49. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9-13 at 277-78 (1977).
50. W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 94 at 673 (1984).
51. A good example of this type of fraud was discussed in Rainsville Bank v. Willing-
ham, 485 So. 2d 319 (Ala. 1986). In this case the Supreme Court of Alabama sustained a
punitive damage award because the bank acted "willfully or maliciously." Id. at 324.
Not all deposits of borrowers are immune from the bank's power to offset. In North-
western Bank v. Coppedge, - Mont. - , 713 P.2d 523 (1986), the Montana Supreme
Court held that a bank had the right to offset money held at a bank against the amount of a
note due to the bank. The offset was permitted by the terms of the promissory note and the
money held at the bank was derived directly from the sale of cattle on which the bank had a
security interest. An older case, Security State Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 78 Mont. 389, 254
P. 417 (1927) held that "it is well settled that money deposited in a bank to the credit of
one of its debtors, without an express agreement to the contrary or a direction to apply it to
a specific purpose, the bank may apply the deposit to the satisfaction of a past due indebt-
edness." Id. at 392, 254 P. at 418. Other jurisdictions have also adopted the rule that a bank
may not offset against deposit made for a special purpose. See First City Nat'l Bank v.
Long-Lewis Hardware Co., 363 So. 2d 770 (Ala. 1978). It should also be noted that many
jurisdictions, including Montana, provide that bankers possess banker's liens. In Montana,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-1502 (1985) provides: "a banker has a general lien, dependent on
possession, upon all property in his hands belonging to the customer, for the balance due to
him from such customer in the course of the business." Although there are no reported
Montana cases interpreting this statute, courts in other jurisdictions have limited the bank's
ability to offset the indebtedness secured by the banker's lien against any deposit. See, e.g.,
Bonhiver v. State Bank, 29 Ill. App. 3d 794, 331 N.E.2d 390 (1975).
52. See First Am. Nat'l Bank v. Mitchell, 359 So. 2d 1376 (Miss. 1978) (bank officer
altered the due date on the note).
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(4) false promises that loans would not be called and that
further loans would be made if officers and director resigned.5 4
Lenders are not always liable for all wrongful acts committed
by their officers or employees. As a general rule bank liability is
limited to officers' or employees' acts committed "within the scope
of his authority. ' 55 Courts have had difficulty in determining when
acts constituting fraud are within the scope of the officer's author-
ity. Lenders usually argue that it is not within the authority of the
officer to take actions which intentionally injure customers. Bor-
rowers argue that it is within the authority of the officer or em-
ployee to extend credit, accept deposits, make representations and
generally deal with the borrower. If the lender's employee commit-
ted a fraud while apparently acting within his authority, the bor-
rowers argue the lender should be responsible. The Restatement
(Second) of Agency specifically provides as a general rule that
when a principal puts an agent in a position to deceive or commit a
fraud upon a third person, the principal is liable for the fraud.5
The fact that the employee acts for his own purposes does not re-
lieve the bank from liability unless its customer knows that the
employee is acting for its own purposes. 7
Bank customers have been successful in recovering from banks
when the connection between the bank's regular course of business
and the officer's actions, at first blush, appears quite remote . 5 The
willingness of courts to hold banks liable for the actions of their
employees, even if the actions amount to fraud, seems reasonable.
Banks are better able than bank customers to evaluate employee
honesty, promulgate and enforce systems and rules to encourage
employee honesty, and identify and terminate employees who are
dishonest.
53. Rutherford v. Rideout Bank, 11 Cal. 2d 479, 80 P.2d 978 (1938). State Nat'l Bank
v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (false threat that a default would be
declared unless management was changed).
54. Stirling v. Chemical Bank, 382 F. Supp. 1146, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
55. The factors which courts typically examine to determine whether actions are
within the scope of a person's employment are described at RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 229 (1958).
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 261 (1958).
57. Id. at § 262.
58. See Rutherford v. Rideout Bank, 11 Cal. 2d 479, 80 P.2d 978 (1938) (borrower sold
ranch at request of bank officer for a below market value price; bank officer had been bribed
by purchaser); First Am. Bank v. Mitchell, 359 So. 2d 1376 (Miss. 1978) (bank officer altered
note); Grenada Bank v. Moore, 131 Miss. 339, 95 So. 449 (1923) (bank officer used cus-
tomer's bonds as security for his own loan).
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2. Misrepresentation of Intention to Renew Note or Extend Ad-
ditional Credit
Clear, garden variety fraud is not common in lawsuits involv-
ing termination of credit. More common are allegations that the
lender made statements to the borrower that credit would be ex-
tended and that these statements amounted to actionable misrep-
resentations. The borrower alleges that he or she was justified in
relying on these statements and that the bank's subsequent failure
to extend credit amounted to fraud pursuant to a theory of misrep-
resentation. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
following elements are necessary for a finding of misrepresentation:
"One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion,
intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to
refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the
other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused by his justifiable reliance
upon the misrepresentation. '5 9 Hence, the issue of whether the
lender has made a tortious misrepresentation involves three pri-
mary questions: (1) Was there a misrepresentation? (2) Did the
conditions make the misrepresentation fraudulent? (3) Was the
borrower justified in relying on the misrepresentation?
The representations made by the lender that lead the bor-
rower to believe that credit may be extended must be examined
carefully. A statement that "we will renew your loan" differs from
the statement that "it is our current thinking that we will renew
your loan." One statement is a representation of fact, while the
other is a representation of intention. A lender that represents its
intention accurately, but later changes its mind, should not neces-
sarily be liable for a tortious misrepresentation. ° In negotiations,
it is common to make tentative statements of intention which are
premised on facts which may or may not be true. For example, if it
appears that the farmer may be eligible for a government subsidy
program the lender may state that the loan might be extended.
Further research, however, may show that the subsidy program is
not as favorable as first expected. So long as it is clear that the
lender is making statements of its current intent and a reasonable
borrower would recognize that the intent is tentative, the lenders
should not be found to have made a misrepresentation. 1
Lenders are not absolutely liable for their misrepresentations.
Misrepresentations only result in lender liability if the statements
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
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are fraudulent.2' The requirement that representations be fraudu-
lent is known as the scienter requirement. Statements are consid-
ered fraudulent, according to the comments to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, if the individual making the statement knows
that the representation he makes is "merely a belief" and recog-
nizes that there is a chance, more or less great, that the fact may
not be as it is represented.6 3 Thus, if a bank officer, knowing that
the loan might not be made, reassures the borrower that a loan will
be made, there will be sufficient evidence of scienter.
Lenders often state that they "probably" will extend credit or
they "think" or "believe" that credit will be renewed if the bor-
rower fulfills certain conditions. A lender should be liable to a bor-
rower when these statements are made if a lender has no basis for
them. For example, if a bank officer states, "I think credit will be
renewed if your operation is profitable," a borrower might reasona-
bly believe that no facts are known to the lender which are incom-
patible with the statements made, and the lender is aware of suffi-
cient facts to allow him to form the opinion stated. If the lender
knows of incompatible facts or has no basis for the statement, the
lender ought to be liable for the misrepresentation." Finally, the
borrower should be required to demonstrate that he or she justifia-
bly relied on the misrepresentation. 5
One of the issues which frequently arises in the context of a
lender severing credit is the issue of whether the borrower could
properly rely on the bank officers who assured them credit would
be renewed. For example, assume a borrower knows that decisions
to extend credit must be made with the approval of a loan commit-
tee, but a loan officer, nonetheless, makes an assurance that the
loan will be renewed. A Missouri Court of Appeals faced with this
very issue held that where a loan officer's authority to renew loans
is limited and the borrower knows it, the borrower cannot com-
plain of an actionable misrepresentation. 6 The court further found
that where one borrower misled the other borrower about the ex-
tent of the bank officer's authority, the other borrower could not
62. Id. at § 526 which states:
A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker
(a) knows or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be,
(b) does not have the confidence in the accuracy of his representation that he
states or implies, or
(c) knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that he states
or implies.
63. Id. at § 526 comment e.
64. See id. at § 539.
65. Id. at § 537.
66. Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
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complain of the officer's misrepresentation."
It has long been recognized that statements certain business
persons make to their customers should be discounted by the cus-
tomers, because the customers should be aware that the interest of
the business persons is to sell the product." Often it is said the
customer should realize the business person is merely "puffing"
about his or her product and that reliance on "puffing" is not justi-
fied. While courts properly hold that a party should not place as
much reliance on statements of a person with an adverse interest,
this general rule should not apply to the lender-farmer relation-
ship. Lenders generally have fostered the image of being a friend
and a business adviser to farmers and should not be viewed as ad-
verse parties.8 9
When examining whether the lender misrepresented the inten-
tion to extend credit, courts, then, must carefully analyze whether
a representation to that effect has, in fact, been made. As dis-
cussed, statements of intention or belief should be treated differ-
ently than firm representations.
3. Misrepresentation of Terms of Loan Documents
Another issue which arises when a lender terminates credit is
whether the lender misrepresented the terms of the note and other
lending documents to the borrower. In contrast to the tort mis-
represention theory of fraud previously described, a borrower or
guarantor who prevails in the theories examined in this section is
usually entitled to avoid a provision of the contract or entitled to
restitution. Claims that the lender did not adequately disclose or
explain the provisions of the loan usually arise when the lender has
an unequivocal right, according to the contract, to foreclose or
sever credit. Examples of these claims are:
(1) the lender failed to explain properly exactly which docu-
ments the customers are signing;'* and
(2) the lender failed to explain to the customer the risk in-
volved with the documents signed by a borrower or guarantor.7 1
'67. Id. at 49-50.
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 539 comment c (1977).
69. See infra note 77.
70. Northwestern Bank v. Roseman, 81 N.C. App. 228, 344 S.E.2d 120, disc. rev. de-
nied, 318 N.C. 284, 348 S.E.2d 139 (1986). In Roseman, a bank customer expressly stated
that he did not want to sign a guarantee but the bank included a guarantee in the packet of
documents.
71. Kurth v. Van Horn, 380 N.W.2d 693 (Iowa 1986). In this case the bank made its
file available to the elderly guarantor prior to the execution of the guarantee and insisted in
meeting with the guarantor outside of the presence of the borrower. Because the decision to
[Vol. 48
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In the context of the termination of credit, two issues typically
arise. The first issue is whether the lender owes a fiduciary duty to
the borrower which results in a duty to disclose matters not other-
wise required to be disclosed. The second issue involves the ques-
tion of how much the lender is expected to explain to the borrower
about the notes. 2
a. Fiduciary Duty
When attempting to argue that lenders have a duty to disclose
or explain certain matters, borrowers frequently encounter the ar-
gument that the lender had no duty to disclose voluntarily certain
information. To overcome that burden, borrowers often argue that
their relationship with the lender is that of a fiduciary. To estab-
lish the case that the lender is a fiduciary, borrowers argue that the
lender was a business adviser. In the farm situation, borrowers
sometimes argue that because they were advised to expand their
business, use certain production materials, or plant certain crops,
the lender acted as a fiduciary.
As a general rule, courts have held that the relationship be-
tween a bank and borrower is not a fiduciary relationship. 7 The
Montana Supreme Court held:
As a general rule, the relationship between a bank and a de-
positor or customer does not ordinarily impose a fiduciary duty of
disclosure upon the bank. They deal at arms length [citation
omitted]. However, special circumstances may dictate otherwise.
One who speaks must say enough to prevent his words from mis-
leading the other party; one who has special knowledge of mate-
rial facts to which the other party does not have access may have
a duty to disclose these facts to the other party; and one who
stands in a confidential or fiduciary relation to the other party to
a transaction must disclose other facts.74
A fiduciary relationship between a lender and borrower may
be established when a borrower demonstrates that a lender acted
as financial adviser to a subservient borrower and the borrower re-
lied on the lender's advice.7 5 Factors a court considers when deter-
execute the guarantee was that of guarantor the bank was not liable.
72. The distinction between these issues was discussed in Central Nat'l Bank v.
Shoup, 501 N.E.2d 1090, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
73. Kurth v. Van Horn, 380 N.W.2d 693, 696 (Iowa 1986); Manson State Bank v.
Tripp, 248 N.W.2d 105, 108 (Iowa 1970); Deist v. Wachholz, - Mont. 678
P.2d 188, 193 (1984).
74. Deist v. Wachholz, Mont -... 678 P.2d 188, 193 (1984).
75. Id. In the Deist case the bank advised a rancher and his wife for 24 years. After
the rancher died, the bank continued to render the advice. As a result the bank was consid-
1987]
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mining whether borrowers are subservient generally include the
borrower's age, mental capacity, health, education and degree of
business experience. The courts also focus on the degree to which
the subservient party entrusted his or her affairs to the lender and
reposed confidence in the lender.76
The amount of advice given by lenders to farmers varies.
Many agricultural lenders seek to develop a reputation that they
know the farm business. Farmers and bank officers, particularly in
small towns, develop close personal relationships to their borrow-
ers that are mutually beneficial. For example, farmers look to
bankers for their views on type of crops to plant, the expected
trend in prices and the desirability of expanding or contracting op-
erations.7 Even those lenders which do not discuss various aspects
of the farm business with their customers usually have some in-
volvement in their customer's business. Banks, as a condition of
making or renewing loans, frequently restrict the operation of the
business and, at times, may require partial liquidations of the
business.
So long as the farmer makes his or her own business decisions
and the advice given by the lender is nothing more than optional
advice or is reasonably related to protection of the lender's interest
in its collateral, lenders should not be treated as having a fiduciary
responsibility to the borrower. Debtors should not be allowed to
rely blindly on advice given by a lender and hold the lender re-
sponsible for its losses if the advice, with the benefit of hindsight,
is not appropriate. To so hold would discourage borrowers from
exercising ordinary prudence in relying on the business advice
given by others.78 As aptly stated by the North Carolina Court of
Appeals: "Courts must cautiously balance the conflicting policies of
suppressing fraud on one hand and discouraging neglect and inat-
ered a fiduciary.
76. Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101 (1937); Fridenmaker v.
Valley Nat'l Bank, 23 Ariz. App. 565, 534 P.2d 1064 (1975); Farmer City State Bank v.
Guingrich, 139 Ill. App. 3d 416, 424, 487 N.E.2d 758, 763 (1985); Denison State Bank v.
Madeira, 230 Kan. 684, 640 P.2d 1235 (1982); Pigg v. Robertson, 549 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1977). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 comment a, at 300 (1979).
77. According to a survey completed by the National Federation of Independent Busi-
nesses conducted in 1982, 95% of small businesses believe that it is important or very im-
portant for their bank to give helpful business suggestions. The survey concludes that 80%
of small businesses believe their bank is above average or good at giving helpful suggestions.
Likewise, 55% of the borrowers believe it is important or very important that the bank
know the borrower and the borrower's business. Dunkelberg, Small Business and the Value
of the Bank-Customer Relationship, 14 J. BANK RES. 251, 253 (1984).
78. Currently the law requires that ordinary prudence be used when relying on busi-
ness associates. Johnson v. Lockman, 41 N.C. App. 54, 58, 254 S.E.2d 187, 189, disc. rev.
denied, 297 N.C. 610, 257 S.E.2d 436 (1979).
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tention toward one's obligations on the other."79 Farmers and
other small business owners are ultimately in the best position to
make decisions regarding their businesses. The mere fact that erro-
neous advice was given by the bank should not result in bank lia-
bility, because it is the farmer that ultimately makes the decision.
Further, occasional advice given by the bank should not be the ba-
sis for a claim of fiduciary duty. Before holding banks liable as
fiduciaries, courts should examine whether advice was given to a
subservient borrower over a period of time. 0
Lenders, under certain circumstances, require borrowers to
comply with loan covenants restricting the operation of the bor-
rower's business. The borrower's consent to these covenants is
often a condition of obtaining a loan or renewal of credit. Condi-
tions precedent to obtaining a loan may include agreements to op-
erate within a specific business plan, liquidate part of the farm or
ranch, or sell some of the equipment. If these conditions are not
fulfilled, the loan will not be extended. Likewise, lenders require
borrowers to make certain covenants concerning the operation of
their business. Usually the lender may declare a default and accel-
erate the due date of the loan if these covenants are breached.
These covenants often include promises to maintain the collateral
and promises to obtain lender approval of certain transactions.
These covenants may serve to keep a "leash" on the operations of
the borrower.8 ' Arrangements such as these should not give rise to
the creation of a fiduciary duty so long as the lender's restraints
are reasonably necessary to protect its interest in the collateral and
are made in good faith.85
Once a fiduciary relationship is established, the lender must
not only refrain from concealing information and making mislead-
ing statements, but also must disclose facts which may reasonably
affect the judgment of the borrower.83 As most aptly stated by the
Arizona Supreme Court, once a fiduciary relationship is estab-
79. Northwestern Bank, 81 N.C. App. at 234, 344 S.E.2d at 124.
80. Compare Deist, - Mont. -, 678 P.2d 188 with Pulse v. North Am. Land
Title Co., - Mont. -, 707 P.2d 1105 (1985). In Deist, where a fiduciary relationship
was found, the bank dealt with the plaintiff and her late husband for 24 years. In Pulse,
where no fiduciary relationship was found, the plaintiff had only dealt with the loan depart-
ment of the bank on a "few" occasions. Pulse, __ Mont. at -, 707 P.2d at 1110.
81. See R. NASSBERG, THE LENDER'S HANDBOOK 16 (1986).
82. Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 35, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521 (1980) ("Nor-
mal supervision of the enterprise by the lender for the protection of its security interest in
loan collateral is not 'active participation'.")
83. Diest, - Mont. at - , 678 P.2d at 195. Other courts have held that material
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lished, "the party in whom confidence is thus reposed must 'lay his
cards on the table'." 8'
b. Duty to Review Documents
Borrowers sometimes allege that even if a lender does not
stand in a fiduciary relationship with the borrower, it has a duty to
disclose and describe certain conditions or covenants in the loan
documents or risks inherent in the loan transaction. The typical
claim is that the borrower signed a stack of papers at closing, did
not read the papers, and was misled as to their content.8 5
The two important cases that discuss this claim are Farmer
City State Bank v. Guingrich8 a and Kurth v. Van Horn. In
Farmer City State Bank, the borrower made the specific statement
that he did not desire to sign an unlimited guarantee which would
guarantee all of the borrower's debt, but would only sign a limited
guarantee of a specific debt. At closing, the guarantor signed an
unlimited guarantee. The guarantor admitted that he did not read
the documents he signed and the bank officer admitted that he did
not inform the guarantor of his obligations under the guarantees.
The court refused to reform the guarantees because the law
presumes that the written instrument describes the intent of the
parties, and the evidence was not sufficient to overcome that pre-
sumption.8 The court also rejected the guarantor's contention that
it stood in a fiduciary relationship with the bank. 9 The court held
that the guarantor had, however, alleged sufficient facts to set
forth a claim for fraud by alleging that the bank falsely and fraud-
ulently represented that guarantees signed by other directors
would protect the original guarantor. The court rejected the bank's
defense that the guarantor could have avoided his loss if he would
have read the documents. The court stated that "actions or state-
ments of the person making a misrepresentation may inhibit the
other person's inquiries or lull him into a false sense of security,
thereby blocking investigation into the truth of the representa-
tion."' 0 The court concluded that there was a false representation
84. Stewart, 49 Ariz. at 44, 64 P.2d at 106.
85. See, e.g., Central Nat'l Bank v. Shoup, 501 N.E.2d 1090 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (fail-
ure to disclose a due on sale clause and a prepayment penalty clause, when the bank knew it
was borrower's intention to sell the collateral).
86. 139 Ill. App. 3d 416, 487 N.E.2d 758 (1985).
87. 380 N.W.2d 693 (Iowa 1986).
88. 139 Ill. App. 3d at 421-22, 487 N.E.2d at 762.
89. Id. at -, 487 N.E.2d at 763 (rejecting Stewart, 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101, which
was cited by the Montana Supreme Court with approval in Diest).
90. Id. at -, 487 N.E.2d at 765.
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made by an experienced bank to an inexperienced person and, as a
result, the bank was liable for fraud."'
Contrast the Farmer City State Bank case to the Kurth case.
In both cases, allegations were made that the bank officer failed to
explain adequately the consequence of cosigning or guaranteeing a
note. In Kurth, a customer who borrowed from the bank pressured
his neighbor, Herman Gerdes, to cosign his bank debt. The bor-
rower pressured Gerdes because the bank threatened a foreclosure
as a result of the borrower's financial difficulties. The bank stood
to benefit from having a cosigner because without the cosigner the
bank might have lost a Farmers Home Administration (FmHA)
guarantee and might have lost an opportunity to receive the pro-
ceeds of a Small Business Administration loan which would have
been used to reduce the amount of the loan due to the bank. The
cosigner alleged that the bank did not make him aware of these
facts. The cosigner was forced to make good on the note and sued
the bank alleging that he relied on the bank officer to render ad-
vice on the contents of the documents he signed or, in the alterna-
tive, the bank failed to advise him to obtain an attorney. 2 The
court rejected the cosignor's allegation that the bank was a fiduci-
ary and upheld the jury finding that there was no fraud. To require
a cosignor to retain an attorney before he does what he clearly
wants to do is a "form of protectionism [that] goes far beyond the
exercise of the banker's responsibilities. . . . The bank had no af-
firmative duty to prevent Gerdes from doing what the evidence
clearly shows he wanted to do."9
The critical difference between its two cases was that, in
Farmer City State Bank, reassuring statements were made to lull
the guarantor into a sense of security while, in Kurth, no such
statements were made. Generally, failure to read the terms of a
contract is not sufficient reason to justify rescission of the contract
because of the presumption that the written contract states the
agreement of the parties. 4 Likewise the farmer should not be able
to avoid a contract and seek restitution or tort damages on a fraud
91. Id. A similar result was reached relying on similar facts in Marine Bank, N.A. v.
Meat Counter, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 1029 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
92. Kurth, 380 N.W.2d at 696-97.
93. Id. at 697.
94. See also Merit Music Serv. Inc. v. Sonneborn, 245 Md. 213, 221-222, 225 A.2d 470,
474 (1967) ("the law presumes that a person knows the contents of a document that he
executes and understands at least the literal meaning of its terms"); Nat'l Bank v. Equity
Inv., 81 Wash. 2d 886, 912-13, 506 P.2d 20, 36 (1973) ("The whole panoply of contract law
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theory due to the lender's lack of explanation of the terms of the
agreement or risks involved. Farmers are business persons and
should be treated as such.96 Lenders should not be responsible for
the borrowers' losses in these cases unless they have taken affirma-
tive steps that are calculated to mislead the borrower.
4. Constructive Fraud/Negligent Misrepresentation
One of the most difficult elements of fraud to prove is the ele-
ment of fraudulent intent. It is particularly difficult for a borrower
to prove which statements the lender's employees knew were not
true or if the employees did not have sufficient information to jus-
tify their statements. As a result, some creditors rely on theories of
constructive fraud when attempting to recover against a lender
when the lender terminates credit. Constructive fraud consists of a
breach of a duty by misleading another to the prejudice of the
other and to the benefit of the person with the duty. 6 A showing
of fraudulent intent is not required. 7 While the theory of con-
structive fraud is generally asserted in a contract action to avoid a
contract,98 it has also been asserted to support a claim for tort
damages. 9
One of the leading cases is Hunt v. McIlroy Bank and
Trust.100 In Hunt, the farmers negotiated financing to expand their
farms. The terms of long-term financing were never finalized, but
short,-term notes, mortgages and other documents were executed so
95. Farmers should not be treated any differently from an "80 year old spinster" who
never engaged in any business activity and who did not read a mineral deed before signing
it. In holding the woman to the terms of the deed the court said, "Neither inexperience nor
inferior knowledge will excuse plaintiff from reading the deed . . . nor in failing to secure
outside advice." Clough v. Jackson, 156 Mont. 272, 286, 479 P.2d 266, 274 (1971).
96. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-406 (1985). See also McGregor v. Mommer, __ Mont.
-,- 714 P.2d 536, 543 (1986); Mends v. Dykstra, 195 Mont. 440, 637 P.2d 502 (1981);
Moschelle v. Hulse, - Mont. , -, 622 P.2d 155, 159 (1980). Although courts often
find constructive fraud in conjunction with the finding of a fiduciary relationship, the find-
ing of a fiduciary relationship is not a prerequisite to a finding of constructive fraud. Mc-
Gregor, - Mont. at -, 714 P.2d at 543. The theory of constructive fraud has been
applied in a case involving a "very close" relationship between a bank and personal guaran-
tors of a loan. 178 Cal. App. 3d 960, 224 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1986).
97. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-406 (1985).
98. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 48, §§ 9-13 at 277-78.
99. The theory of constructive fraud has apparently been used in Montana outside the
area of contract damages. See Farmers State Bank v. Imperial Cattle Co., - Mont. ..
708 P.2d 223 (1985). More properly, the courts should analyze these cases in terms of negli-
gent misrepresentation, although the elements of constructive fraud and negligent misrepre-
sentation are simple. Both involve some sort of undertaking or duty and both do not require
fraudulent intent. See supra text accompanying notes 106-12.
100. 2 Ark. App. 88. 616 S.W.2d 759 (1981).
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expansion could immediately begin.0 The farmers' theory was
that short-term financing would not have been accepted, if they
had not been misled by the bank that long-term financing would
be provided. In rejecting the farmers' argument, the court found
that there was no evidence that the lender made any untrue state-
ment.102 Although the court found the farmers believed more funds
and long-term financing were forthcoming, the bank acted in good
faith by "attempting to work with" the borrowers. 103 The bank was
not liable because it did not intentionally mislead the bor-
rower-the Federal Reserve Board had reclassified the loan be-
cause of declining value of the collateral.'0 4 The Hunt case is sig-
nificant because it approved of the bank changing its willingness to
extend credit to the borrower because the declining value of the
security was not anticipated at the time of the loan and it ap-
proved of a reclassification of the loan and termination of the
credit notwithstanding evidence of discussions of permanent
financing.'0 5
Although the concept of constructive fraud is usually used as a
defense to a contract action, it is also proper to find constructive
fraud in the tort sense when there is no proof of an intent to
deceive. Virtually all courts recognize that negligent, but not
fraudulent, misrepresentation may provide a basis of liability when
the parties have a pre-existing relationship or where the nature of
the representative's relationship creates a special duty.10 6 For ex-
ample, several courts have held that when a bank seeks to give
advice to a customer about the creditworthiness of another bor-
rower, it will be liable if incorrect advice is negligently given.0 7
These courts reason that because the bank is rendering a service to
someone with which it has a relationship, there is a special duty to
render the service with care. The holding in these cases is consis-
tent with section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which
states:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employ-
ment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary
101. Id. at 90, 616 S.W.2d at 761.




106. W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 107 at 746 (1984). See also
Crystal Springs Trout Co. v. First State Bank, - Mont. -, 732 P.2d 819 (1987); North-
western Nat'l Bank v. Weaver-Maxwell, Inc., - Mont. 729 P.2d 1258 (1986).
107. Bank of Nevada v. Butler Aviation-O'Hare, Inc., 96 Nev. 763, 765, 616 P.2d 398,
399 (1980); First City Bank v. Global Auctioneers, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
1987]
25
Bahls: Termination of Credit for the Farm or Ranch: Theories of Lender Liability
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1987
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in
their business transactions, is subject to liabilities for pecuniary
loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the informa-
tion, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in defin-
ing or communicating the information.'"5
The typical lender ought to be responsible for his or her negli-
gent misrepresentation to borrowers because the typical lender
makes these statements in the course of its business with the bor-
rowers. Borrowers are entitled to expect that bank officers who
make statements that a loan will probably be renewed will use or-
dinary care and competence when making those statements.' 9
The Montana Supreme Court applied the doctrine of negligent
misrepresentation to the termination of credit in State Bank of
Townsend v. Maryann's, Inc. 10 In this case the bank officer in-
serted a $50,000 borrowing limit in a bank customer's corporate
borrowing resolution. Within the next five months, the bank ex-
tended credit in the amount of $29,000. The customer desired to
obtain an additional $17,000 loan to exercise an option under a
lease agreement. The bank refused to make the loan and the lease
option was rescinded by the lessor. Shortly thereafter the bank de-
clared the customer's notes due and sued to collect the amount
due. The customer filed a counterclaim alleging that the bank had
represented that a $50,000 line of credit would be available. Based
on testimony that the bank inserted $50,000 in the borrowing reso-
lution, the court found that the evidence appeared sufficient to
support the finding of negligent misrepresentation. The Montana
Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court because of
error in the jury instructions and special interrogatories, with in-
structions that the bank's conduct be tested against Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 552. The court specifically noted, by
quoting the comments to the Restatement, that one who makes a
negligent representation will be responsible for that representation
only if "the maker was manifestly aware of the use to which the
information was to be put and intended to supply it for that
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977). This provision of the Restate-
ment has been quoted with approval by the Montana Supreme Court in State Bank v.
Maryann's, Inc., - Mont. - - 664 P.2d 295, 301 (1983), and Brown v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., __ Mont. -, , 640 P.2d 453, 458-59 (1982).
109. One court found that because the banking business is affected with the public
interest, banks must use reasonable care in dealing with their customers. The court held
that this duty of care included a duty against negligent misrepresentations. Hill v. Equitable
Bank, 655 F. Supp. 631, 650-51 (D. Del. 1987).
110. - Mont. -, 664 P.2d 295 (1983). See also Crystal Springs Trout Co. v. First
State Bank, - Mont. -, 732 P.2d 819 (1987).
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Negligent misrepresentation should not serve to hold lenders
responsible for their predictions as to how much credit may be ex-
tended in the future, when all parties are aware that the lenders'




Another argument asserted by borrowers that is closely related
to fraud is the tort of economic duress. The tort of economic du-
ress should be distinguished from defense of duress to a contract
action. Duress in contract actions merely avoids the contract and
serves as a basis for a claim of restitution, while the tort of eco-
nomic duress may result in tort damages." 3 The elements of the
tort of duress are:
[1] [T]here is a threat to do an act the threatening party has no
legal right to do [2] [The threat] must ... destroy the free
agency of the party against whom it is directed .... [3] The
restraint caused by such threat must be imminent [4] It must be
such that the person to whom it is directed has no present means
of protection."'
Although the Montana Supreme Court is not sympathetic to
claims of economic duress," 5 a recent Texas case should encourage
attorneys representing borrowers about the viability of the action
when asserted against banks. In State National Bank of El Paso v.
Farah Manufacturing Co., Inc.,"' a Texas Court of Appeals up-
held an $18 million judgment against the State National Bank, in
part on the theory of economic duress. In this case the State Na-
111. Id. at - , 664 P.2d at 302 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552
comment a at 127-30). For another good discussion of the application of the theory of negli-
gent misrepresentation to termination of credit, see Banker's Trust v. Steenburn, 95 Misc.
2d 967, -, 407 N.Y.S.2d 51, 66-68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
112. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court of Montana has held that
"[t]here is a right to rely when parties are not on equal footing and do not have equal means
of knowing the truth." Brown v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., - Mont.
__ _ ' 640 P.2d 453, 459 (1982). See also Koch v. Rhodes, 57 Mont. 447, 188 P. 933
(1920).
113. See State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 683 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984).
114. Id., at 684 (quoting Dale v. Simon, 267 S.W. 467, 470 (Tex. Ct. App. 1924)).
115. Montana cases have dealt with economic duress as a defense in a contract action.
See Kovash v. Knight, 169 Mont. 227, 545 P.2d 1091 (1976); Double X Ranch, Inc. v. Savage
Bros., 167 Mont. 231, 536 P.2d 1176 (1975); McNussen v. Graybeal, 146 Mont. 173, 405 P.2d
447 (1965).
116. 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
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tional Bank was unhappy that William Farah was about to be
elected as a director of Farah Manufacturing Co., Inc., instead of a
director preferred by the bank. State National Bank warned share-
holders that if William was elected, it would consider the election
an event of default, which would entitle the bank to accelerate the
loan. State National Bank was one of three banks participating in
the loan. The banks, by contract, had the right to accelerate the
loan if the company's management was changed. The right to ac-
celerate was subject to the provisions of Texas U.C.C. § 1-208 that
states that the lender's proposal to accelerate must stem "from a
reasonable, good faith belief that its security was about to be im-
paired." 1 7 The banks had the contractual right to accelerate, but
only when two of the three banks agreed to elect to accelerate.
State National Bank, without obtaining the agreement of the other
banks, made the threat to accelerate if there was a change of man-
agement.1 18 Making threats to encourage the borrower to vote to
reelect State National Bank designated management constituted
duress, for which the injured borrower could receive tort
damages."'
The success of Farah Manufacturing Company may encourage
borrowers' attorneys to take a careful look at the tort of economic
duress as a weapon to use against farm lenders when the farm
lender tightens up or terminates credit. The tort of duress arises
when a bank makes a threat to take adverse action on a loan unless
the farmer takes certain actions (e.g., plants specific crops, sells
certain assets, changes management), if these threats either are not
permitted by the agreement or bear no relationship to preservation
of the bank's interest in the collateral. In these cases the rules set
forth in State National Bank should apply. State National Bank,
however, should be narrowly construed. If the loan is due, bank
demands should not provide a basis for the tort of duress. The ap-
plication of State National Bank should be limited to loans that
are not due. When a loan is due the lender is not bound by the
good faith requirements of U.C.C. § 1-208.120 The holding of State
117. Id. at 685. The language of U.C.C. § 1-208 purports to require the lender to act in
good faith when accelerating a loan "at will" or "when [the creditor] deems [it]self insecure
or words of similar import." Several federal courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have held
that the good faith requirement applies to most events of default. Brown v. Avenco Inv.
Corp., 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979) (covenant not to lease the collateral) and Sheppard
Federal Credit Union v. Palmer, 408 F.2d 1369 (5th Cir. 1969).
118. State Nat'l Bank, 678 S.W.2d at 686.
119. Id.
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National Bank is premised on U.C.C. § 1-208. When a note is due,
the lender, absent extraordinary circumstances, should be free to
use its limited resources to loan its money to the most
creditworthy borrower available in order to discharge its obliga-
tions to return a maximum profit for the benefit of its
shareholders.
Those jurisdictions recognizing the tort of economic duress
should apply the standards used when economic duress is asserted
in contract actions. Just as courts require a showing of wrongful or
unlawful conduct when duress is alleged as a defense to contract
actions,121 courts should apply a similar standard to the tort of du-
ress when dealing with credit problems. Absent use of improper
means, lenders must be able to realize and enforce the protections
provided for their benefit in the lending instruments. Otherwise,
the benefit of the bargain, for the lenders, is destroyed. As the
Court in State National Bank stated: "[t]hreatening to do that
which a party has the legal right to do cannot form the basis of a
claim of duress by business compulsion. The vice arises when he
employs extortive measures, or when, lacking good faith, he made
improper demands. ' ' 122 An overbroad application of the tort of du-
ress would effectively deprive the farm lenders from the ability to
drive a hard bargain-a step which would be unprecedented. 123
C. Interference with Contract
A less common claim made against lenders is that their failure
to extend credit interfered with the borrower's contracts or pro-
spective contractual relations with its other customers or credi-
tors.12 This theory may be attractive where it is impossible to
121. McNussen v. Graybeal, 146 Mont. 173, 405 P.2d 447 (1965). Although the Mon-
tana Supreme Court has not found sufficient evidence of wrongful conduct in connection
loan with contract action defense, the New Mexico Supreme Court has. In the landmark
case of Pecos Constr. Co. v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 80 N.M. 680, 459 P.2d 842 (1969), a lender
entered into a binding loan commitment with a borrower. When it was time to fund the
loan, the borrower unilaterally demanded a higher commitment fee. The court, relying on
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 492, and finding intentional and wrongful conduct
found that '[f]ear of an economic loss is a form of duress; thus, a party is not bound by the
contract.'" Pecos Constr. Co., 80 N.M. at 683-84, 459 P.2d at 844-45.
122. State Nat'l Bank, 678 S.W.2d at 684.
123. Likewise, 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 1618 (rev. ed. 1937), recognizes that to
broaden the defense of duress in a contract action may preclude a person from driving a
hard bargain.
124. The elements of the tort of interference with existing contracts are as follows:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a con-
tract . . . between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing
the third person not to perform the contract is subject to liability to the other for
the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to
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prove all of the elements of a contract to extend credit.
The successful application of this theory was best illustrated
in Peterson v. First National Bank.'25 Peterson did not have suffi-
cient funds to pay the rent due on his farm. Peterson obtained a
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) loan using crops as collat-
eral. Discussion ensued between Peterson and the bank about the
possibility of assigning CCC proceeds to the bank in exchange for a
loan to pay the rent. Peterson tendered the past due rent to the
landlord, telling the landlord that his check for rent could be de-
posited when the CCC proceeds were received from the bank. In-
stead of making the proceeds available to the borrower or landlord,
the bank offset the checks against the amount of the debt and re-
fused to lend Peterson the funds to pay the landlord. The landlord
terminated the lease of the farm because the rent was not paid." 6
The issue before the Court was whether the bank interfered
with the rental contract. The bank's major defense was that it was
privileged or justified to refuse to lend additional monies." 7 Spe-
cifically the bank alleged that (a) it had a financial interest in the
farmer; (b) it acted with the intention of protecting its interest
from being jeopardized; and, (c) it did not employ improper means
in doing so. The court, without addressing the first two allegations,
stated that there was evidence that the bank did not act with
proper means.1 8 The court did not specify exactly what improper
means were used by the bank, but presumably it was based upon
the loan officer's concession that he may have left the landlord
with "the impression" that the rent would have been paid out of
the CCC proceeds.12 9 It is difficult to determine why the landlord's
perform the contract.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 at 7 (1979). See also Northwestern Nat'l Bank v.
Weaver-Maxwell, Inc., - Mont. ., 729 P.2d 1258 (1986).
125. 392 N.W.2d 158 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986).
126. Id. at 160.
127. Usually, the defense raised by the bank would be applicable only in cases involv-
ing prospective contractual relations. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 769 (1979),
which states:
One who, having a financial interest in the business of a third person inten-
tionally causes that person not to enter into a prospective contractual relation
with another does not interfere improperly with the other's relation if he
(a) does not employ wrongful means and
(b) acts to protect his interest from being prejudiced by the relation.
More properly, the bank should have relied on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767
(1979) which describes when an actor may properly interfere with existing contracts. The
importance of the defense of justification, when asserted against a bank, was discussed in
Northwestern Nat'l Bank, - Mont. at -, 729 P.2d at 1262-63.
128. Peterson, 392 N.W.2d at 167.
129. Id. at 160-61.
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impression that he would be paid supports the tenant's claim that
a contract was interfered with. Generally, courts should hesitate to
find that a failure to extend credit interfered with contracts unless
the lender's commitment to extend credit amounts to a fraudulent
misrepresentation. If the borrower relies on a misrepresentation for
the basis of his claim for tortious interference with contract, the
borrower must be able to demonstrate that the lender made a rep-
resentation knowing it was false, without confidence in its accu-
racy, or without sufficient basis.13 0 Predictions that credit may be
extended or statements of intention to extend credit must be scru-
tinized by the courts in the same way they would be if the claim
was one of misrepresentation. 31 Usually mere predictions or state-
ments of intention should not give rise to tort liability for misrep-
resentation' 32 or tortious interference with contract.
D. Negligence in Processing a Loan Renewal Application
Some farmers believe that lenders, because of their desire to
limit their agricultural lending, superficially review loan applica-
tions or requests to extend the due date of the loan, but do not
seriously consider them. If a lender undertakes to review a loan
application or a renewal application, and the application meets its
guidelines, but is rejected nonetheless, is the lender liable on a the-
ory of negligence? It depends upon whether the lender, by taking a
loan application, owes a duty to the borrower to review the loan
application with care. The existence of this duty depends upon an
analysis of considerations of policy as well as "changing social con-
ditions" which entitle plaintiffs to protection. 3 Although there are
very few cases which discuss this issue or these considerations,
claims based on negligence are on the cutting edge of the law con-
cerning lender liability.
The best discussion of the issue of negligent review of a loan
application is the decision of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in
Jacques v. First National Bank."4 In Jacques, the prospective
borrowers, who had a contract to purchase a home, applied for a
bank loan. The bank collected a fee for an appraisal and credit
check and agreed to "lock in" an interest rate for 90 days. Because
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 526, 767 comment c (1979).
131. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 59-63.
132. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 64-69.
133. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 50, § 53 at 359 (1984).
134. 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (Md. Ct. App. 1986). The rationale of the Maryland
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the bank failed to process the application in accordance with its
standards, the borrowers received a commitment for a much
smaller loan than they desired. Interest rates increased while the
loan application was being processed. The borrowers claimed they
suffered an economic loss because of the increased interest rate.'35
The court noted that since the damage to the prospective borrower
was economic loss only, the court must determine whether there is
sufficient "intimate nexus" to justify the creation of a duty to pro-
cess the loan application with care.13 6 The intimate nexus could be
established by contractual privity or the equivalent. The court
held there was "intimate nexus," because the bank received a fee
(albeit the fee was to be paid to third parties for appraisal and
credit reports) and locked in an interest rate.'17 Further, the bank
would have received a business advantage if the loan were made.
The court found that those actions, in effect, enticed the customer
to deal with that bank and no other.'3 8 As a result, the bank had a
duty because it "expressly undertook to process the application,
advised its customer of the probable time required for processing,
guaranteed a specified rate of interest for a period of ninety days
• . . and entered upon performance."' 39 The court also noted that
borrower was committed to purchase real estate and would be re-
quired to generate more cash if the maximum loan available from
the bank was less than expected.'40 Finally, the court noted that
"the banking business is affected with the public interest;" there-
fore "banks and their officers have been held to a high degree of
integrity and responsiveness to their public calling."'' The court
then held that a jury could have found that the bank departed
from the applicable standard of care. Among other departures, 1)
the loan officer averaged two years of income, instead of the usual
three years; 2) certain income from stock was excluded; and, 3) the
bank failed to consider that the borrower's past income was lower
due to illness.'4 2
135. 307 Md. at 530, 515 A.2d at 757.
136. Id. at 534-35, 515 A.2d at 759-60.
137. Id. at 537-38, 515 A.2d at 761.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 539, 515 A.2d at 762.
140. Id. at 540-41, 515 A.2d at 762-63.
141. Id. at 542, 515 A.2d at 763.
142. Id. at 544 n.7, 515 A.2d at 765 n.7. The Maryland decision is subject to criticism.
Many of the actions the court found to be bank "errors" are within the bank's normal deci-
sion-making analysis. For example, if the customer's income is low because the customer
was sick for two years, the bank may properly assume that sickness may reoccur. The bank
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The bank argued that a credit decision is a "largely judgmen-
tal process of evaluating loan applications [and] defies the imposi-
tion of a standard [of care].' 43 The court rejected this analysis
because standards of care are set for many defendants, such as
physicians, who exercise judgment. The court cautioned, however,
that proof that another banker would have made the loan is not
sufficient:
To be successful then, a plaintiff must show more than that
another banker would have approved a loan that was refused, or
would have found a customer qualified for a different amount.
The plaintiff must show that a defendant failed to exercise that
degree of care which a reasonably prudent bank would have exer-
cised under the same or similar circumstance.""
The duty to process a loan application with care should not extend
to all loan applications, but only to those where the lender's ac-
tions are sufficient to lead the borrower to reasonably believe that
he or she will be treated in accordance with identifiable lender
standards. A California Court of Appeals, in Wagner v. Benson,
correctly held that the general rule is that in approving a loan ap-
plication, a lender owes no duty of care. 45 In Jacques, the court
distinguished the undertaking to the bank to lock in an interest
rate from a unilateral submission of a loan application. 46
A duty of the lender to act with care when processing loan
applications would presumably apply to agreeing to undertake as-
sisting a borrower to obtain a government backed loan, including a
FmHA loan. Although lenders are not obligated to assist their cus-
tomers in obtaining such loans, once they voluntarily undertake to
do so, they must act with care.",7
In the case of a borrower who is unable to pay the principal or
interest on a loan and applies for renewal of the loan, it would
seem that the same duty would apply, but only if the lender under-
takes to review the application and discourages the borrower from
going elsewhere. If the lender undertakes to review the application,
then such review must be made in accordance with reasonable
143. Id. at 543, 515 A.2d at 764.
144. Id. at 543-44, 515 A.2d at 764.
145. 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 35, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521 (1980) (bank was not negligent in
failing to inform borrowers that the borrowers were about to invest the loan proceeds in a
risky venture).
146. Jacques, 307 Md. at 538-39, 515 A.2d at 762. See also John Deere & Co. v. Short,
378 S.W.2d 496, 502-03 (Mo. 1964); Farabee Treadwell Co. v. Union & Planters' Bank &
Trust, 135 Tenn. 208, 186 S.W. 92 (1916).
147. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Caudle, 425 So. 2d 1050 (Ala. 1983); but see
Brasher v. First Ala. Real Estate Fin., Inc., 447 So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1984).
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standards. A borrower's chances of prevailing, however, when a
loan is already delinquent under this theory seems quite remote. If
the loan is already delinquent, a lender may reasonably decide not
to extend the date of the loan and immediately exercise the rights
against the collateral.
E. Statutory Theories
If the borrower is borrowing from a federal agency or has a
loan guaranteed by a federal agency, the borrower may have cer-
tain statutory rights after a default. For example, borrowers who
have Farmers Home Administration loans are entitled to request
certain "servicing options" which may allow the debtor to reamor-
tize, consolidate or defer the loan.1 48 A discussion of these regula-
tions is beyond the scope of this article. '49
Farmers who have received loans from the FmHA have initi-
ated actions against the government when those loans are called
due or when further credit is not extended, alleging deprivation of
a constitutionally protected property interest in FmHA benefits.
Courts have denied these claims on the basis that receipt of past
FmHA loan does not give rise to a constitutionally protected inter-
est in future FmHA loans. 5'
F. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing
There are two allegations made by plaintiffs when they believe
the lender has not acted in good faith. The most common theory
alleges that the lender breached its duty to act in good faith as
required by the Uniform Commercial Code. The second claim, re-
jected by several jurisdictions, is that the lender breached the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
1. Uniform Commercial Code Duty to Act in Good Faith
Two provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code require lend-
ers to act in good faith. The most general provision, § 1-203 pro-
vides that "every contact or duty within this code imposes an obli-
148. See Curry v. Block, 738 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1984); Allison v. Block, 723 F.2d 631
(8th Cir. 1983); Coleman v. Block, 580 F. Supp. 194 (D.N.D. 1983).
149. For a good discussion of a farmer's rights when dealing with the FmHA, see Min-
nesota Legal Services Coalition, FARMERS GUIDE TO FMHA (1986).
150. DeJournett v. Block, 799 F.2d 430, 431 (8th Cir. 1986); Bass v. United States
Dep't of Agric., 737 F.2d 1408, 1416 (5th Cir. 1984) (Garwood, J., concurring).
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gation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."' 51 A more
specific provision, § 1-208, states that a lender may not "accelerate
payment or performance or require collateral or additional collat-
eral 'at will' or 'when he deems himself insecure'" unless the
lender "in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or per-
formance is impaired."'
' 52
Good faith is defined by the Uniform Commercial Code § 1-
201(19) to mean "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned."' 53 The honesty in fact standard is a subjective stan-
dard which examines the actual intentions of the individuals tak-
ing the action. The standard is different than the more objective
standard of whether the lender's conduct is commercially
reasonable.
a. Application of U.C.C. Principles to Acceleration or Demands
for More Collateral
Courts have devised a good deal of law to measure whether a
lender is acting in good faith when accelerating the loan or requir-
ing additional collateral under the Uniform Commercial Code. To
determine whether the lender acted in good faith, the belief of the
lender is scrutinized. The question is whether the lender actually
believed the debt was impaired, rather than whether his or her be-
lief is accurate. 54 The lender's belief should be treated as being
made in good faith if it is not "bereft of rational basis [and does
not] amount to an open abuse of. . .discretionary power."'1 55 It is,
therefore, improper for the courts to make their own determination
of whether the collateral was actually impaired; rather the court
should limit its inquiry as to whether the lender actually believed
the collateral was impaired and whether that belief was bereft of a
rational basis.
151. This provision is found at MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-203 (1985). The standards of
the U.C.C. are similar to the standards set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
205 (1981).
152. This provision is found at MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-208 (1985).
153. This provision is found at MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-201(19) (1985). This standard
is less stringent than the good faith standard found in U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) of the Uniform
Commercial Code which requires commercial reasonableness and thus more objective than
the Article One standard. Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 798, 812 (1958). See also United States v. Cain, 736 F.2d 1195, 1197
(7th Cir. 1984).
154. Smith v. Union State Bank, 452 N.E.2d 1059, 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Fort
Knox Nat'l Bank v. Gustafson, 385 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Ky. 1964); Van Horn v. Van De Wol,
Inc., 6 Wash. App. 959, 961-62, 497 P.2d 252, 254 (1972).
155. K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 761 n. 12 (6th Cir. 1985); Rigby
Corp. v. Boatman's Bank & Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517, 533 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
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b. Application of U.C.C. Principles to Demand Notes
Although U.C.C. § 1-208 clearly applies to acceleration of
credit or requirements of additional collateral, does the U.C.C.,
through § 1-203 or § 1-208, require that the lender act in good
faith when calling a demand note? Since a demand note cannot by
its terms be accelerated, it would seem that the provisions of
U.C.C. § 1-208 should not apply to demand notes. Further, U.C.C.
§ 1-208 was not intended to deprive a party from enforcing its
rights under a contract, in this case the right to call the loan
due.156 The issue, then, is whether U.C.C. § 1-203 applies to de-
mands for payment of demand notes.
In Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc.,"5 7 the issue was
whether the lender acted in good faith in demanding payment on a
demand note. The borrowers argued that the lender failed to act in
good faith as required by U.C.C. § 1-203 because, among other
things, it demanded payment three days after it received personal
guarantees to support the loan. The court rejected the borrower's
argument, stating that "[tihe imposition of a good faith defense to
the call for payment of a demand note transcends the performance
or enforcement of a contract and in fact adds a term to the agree-
ment which the parties had not included.1 58 The court then held
that lenders should not be held to the standards of U.C.C. § 1-203
when demanding payment on a demand note.
Although a lender does not violate the U.C.C. obligation of
good faith by calling a demand loan, the lender may, in fact, vio-
late the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing found in
tort law in doing so.1 5 1
c. Application of U.C.C. Principles to Negotiations of Renewal
or Extension of a Loan
The good faith obligations of the Uniform Commercial Code
should not apply to negotiations to renew a loan which is due or to
extend new credit. The good faith requirements of U.C.C. §§ 1-203
and 1-208 by their terms apply only to existing contracts. As a re-
sult, it would seem that these provisions should not apply to the
156. See, R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-203:11 (3d ed. 1981).
157. 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
158. Id. at 48. See also Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Gray Distrib. Sys. Inc., 485 So. 2d 1336
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis Denney Ford, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 846,
269 S.E.2d 916 (1980); Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 10 Wash.
App. 530, 518 P.2d 734, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 967 (1974). But see K.M.C. Co. v. Irving
Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
159. See infra text accompanying notes 167-206.
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negotiations to loan money where no loan exists currently, or to
extend the due date of a loan. When a loan is due, it is akin to a
demand loan. The rationale that U.C.C. § 1-203 does not apply to
demand loans should apply with equal force to loans which are
past due.160
There should be one exception to this rule: a duty of good
faith should apply when a lender makes a loan commitment, which
is, in and of itself, a contract. In that case, both the lender and the
customer have a duty to act in good faith when negotiating the
final and definitive terms of the documents necessary to effectuate
the loan. The parties, in essence, have entered a contract to enter a
more definitive contract, thus the good faith duty should be
applied.161
d. Remedies for Violation of the U.C.C. Duties of Good Faith
Considerable confusion exists as to whether a lender's failure
to act in good faith as required by the U.C.C. results in both a
breach of contract (and contract damages) and a separate tort
(with tort and possibly punitive damages). The most definitive
statement that tort damages are available for a breach of U.C.C. §
1-203 or § 1-208 is the Montana Supreme Court decision in First
National Bank in Libby v. Twombly,'62 which states "when the
duty to exercise good faith is imposed by law rather than the con-
tract itself the breach of that duty is tortious."'163 The Montana
Supreme Court likened the conduct of the bank to that of the in-
surance company in Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Com-
pany,164 and held that tort damages were appropriate.6 5
States which do not recognize the tort of breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, generally do not recognize
160. Comment c to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS also recognizes that the
duty of good faith "does not deal with good faith in the formation of a contract," RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 comment c (1981). It should be noted, however, that one
court found that a lender could be liable for failing to give adequate notice that it would not
advance further funds when there was a pattern of prior advances and where the debtor was
able to make regular and continued payments. K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 760-63. The notice
rule of K.M.C. Co., however, should not apply "if the lender had reason to believe that the
borrower would not be capable of payment or performance, or if the borrower otherwise falls
outside the lender's eligibility guidelines." East Lansing State Bank v. Red Cedar Constr.,
63 Bankr. 228, 238 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
161. See, e.g., Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Butler, 626 F. Supp. 1229, 1232
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("courts will enforce a duty of good faith, including good faith negotiation,
in order that a party not escape from the obligation he has contracted to perform").
162. - Mont. - , 689 P.2d 1226 (1984).
163. Id. at -, 689 P.2d at 1230.
164. - Mont. - , 668 P.2d 213 (1983).
165. Twombly, - Mont. at - , 689 P.2d at 1230.
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that breach of the U.C.C. duty of good faith amounts to a tort.166
Courts in these states reason that the provisions of U.C.C. § 1-106
expressly provide that damages for violation of such provisions as
U.C.C. §§ 1-203 or 1-208 are contract damages. 11 7 These courts fur-
ther argue that to allow courts to test the good faith of a lender
under tort standards of reasonableness would vitiate the "honesty
in fact" standard of the U.C.C.
2. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The Montana Supreme Court and legislature have been on the
leading edge of a trend which holds lenders liable for tort damages
as a result of a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing when applied to the extension of credit. The standard
which the Montana Supreme Court applies was set forth in Nich-
olson v. United Pacific Insurance Co. 168 In Nicholson, the court
set forth the following standard: "The nature and extent of an im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is measured in a par-
ticular contract by the justifiable expectation of the parties. The
second party then should be compensated for damages resulting
from the other's culpable conduct."1 9
166. Nobs Chemicals, U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co., Inc., 616 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir.
1980); Interco, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 560 F.2d 480, 485 (1st Cir. 1977); Allied Canners &
Packers, Inc. v. Victor Packing Co., 162 Cal. App. 3d 905, -, 209 Cal. Rptr. 60, 65 (1984);
Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 175 Ind. App. 150, 172, 370 N.E.2d 918, 927 (1977); Rigby
Corp. v. Boatman's Bank and Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Waters v.
Trenckman, 503 P.2d 1187, 1191 (Wyo. 1972).
167. U.C.C. § 1-106 states "[t]he remedies provided by this chapter shall be liberally
administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the
other party had fully performed but neither consequential or special nor penal damages may
be had ...."
168. - Mont. -, 710 P.2d 1342 (1985). The four Montana cases discussing the
application of the tort of bad faith to lenders were decided before Nicholson. See Central
Bank v. Eystad, Mont. - , 710 P.2d 710 (1985); First Nat'l Mont. Bank v. McGui-
ness, - Mont. -, 705 P.2d 579 (1985); Tribby v. Northwestern Bank, - Mont. - ,
704 P.2d 409 (1985); Twombly, - Mont. -, 689 P.2d 1226. The Montana Supreme
Court used Nicholson as an opportunity to "fully articulate" its view of the law. Id. at -,
710 P.2d at 1347. Nicholson, however, was cited by the Montana Supreme Court as the
standard for the application of the tort of bad faith to the commercial setting. See Thiel v.
Johnson, - Mont. -, 711 P.2d 829 (1985); McGregor v. Momrnmer, - Mont....
-, 714 P.2d 536, 543 (1986); Dunfee v. Baskin-Robbins, __ Mont. __, 726 P.2d 1145
(1986).
169. Nicholson, __ Mont. at - , 710 P.2d at 1348. Montana also has codified the
definition of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See 1987 Mont. Laws -
(House Bill 592). The Montana Legislature has defined "[t]he conduct required by the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing [as] honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in trade." Id. The effect of this legislation is
to test the defendant's conduct under both the subjective ("honesty-in-fact") standard and
the objective (commercial reasonableness) standard. If either standard is violated, the de-
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The application of the notion that banks must act in good
faith was first made in First National Bank in Libby v.
Twombly.170 Craig and Lorraine Twombly obtained a commitment
from Johnson, a Vice President of the First National Bank in
Libby, to convert a promissory note to an installment note if the
Twomblys made "some reduction" of principal and paid the ac-
crued interest. When the Twomblys were ready to sign the loan
papers, they learned that they would have to deal with a different
Vice President, Haines, because Johnson was out of town. Haines
refused to convert the note and offset the amount of the Twom-
blys' promissory note against the Twomblys' checking account,
leaving the Twomblys with a checking account balance of $1.65.
The Twomblys were not given notice of the offset and Craig
Twombly first learned about the bank's offset when he tried to
cash a check. Twombly tried to discuss the matter with Haines
twice but was unable to do so. Haines argued he took the action
that he did because Twombly said he would not pay the note. To
cover the dishonored checks, the Twomblys were forced to sell as-
sets of their business."
The Supreme Court measured the bank's conduct (accelerat-
ing the note and offsetting the debt against the checking account)
against the standards set by the Montana Uniform Commercial
Code. The court focused on UCC § 1-203 which provides: "Every
contract or duty within this code imposes an obligation of good
faith in its performance or enforcement." '72
The jury found, and the court sustained, that the bank
breached the statutory obligations to act in good faith and that it
fendant has breached the implied covenant. Presumably this definition of a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing found in this legislation is consistent with
the definition found in the Nicholson case. In order for a party's conduct to exceed the
justifiable expectation of the others, the party must act "arbitrarily, capriciously or unrea-
sonably." - Mont. at - , 710 P.2d at 1342. Subsequent cases interpreting Nicholson
have made it clear that it was the court's intent to require more than a subjective test, but
also an objective test. McGregor v. Mommer, - Mont. - ... 714 P.2d 536, 543
(1986). It would seem, then, that the rationale of the Montana Supreme Court espoused in
cases decided before 1987 Mont. Laws - (House Bill 592) will still be determinative in
deciding when the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been breached. Fur-
ther, 1987 Mont. Laws - (House Bill 592) defines conduct required when the implied
covenant exists, but is silent as to when the covenant is implied. As a result, whether the
covenant is implied will still depend upon the reasonable expectations of the parties as dis-
cussed in Nicholson.
170. - Mont. -, 689 P.2d 1226 (1985).
171. Id. at - , 689 P.2d at 1228-29.
172. The court also examined MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-208 (1985) which provides that
a bank may only accelerate pursuant to an "at will" acceleration clause or similar clause if
the bank "in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired."
Twombly, - Mont. at - , 689 P.2d at 1229.
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made false representations to Twombly. A breach of the statutory
obligation, it held, was tortious and punitive damages were
reasonable.""3
The Twombly case was criticized in Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's
Bank and Trust Co., 7 4 as "not expound[ing] a rationale consonant
with that integral rationale of the [Uniform Commercial] Code. '175
The Missouri court argued that U.C.C. § 1-106, by its terms, does
not allow punitive damages and "confines recovery for the breach
of a Code obligation-§ 1-203- to the contours of a contract
breach, and hence that § 1-203 imposes a duty of contract and not
tort.'' 7 6 The criticism that U.C.C. § 1-203 does not provide for pu-
nitive damages is unjust because U.C.C. § 1-106 enables the ag-
grieved party to resort to other rules of law.177 Furthermore, there
is nothing in the Uniform Commercial Code to suggest that it
preempts the general tort law of the state which may allow for tort
damages if the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
breached.
The court, in Twombly, sent confusing signals to the bar about
whether the obligation "good faith" would be broadly applied to
lenders. The court specifically noted that the case presented "a
rather unique fact situation.' 7  Only three days after the
Twombly decision, however, in Tribby v. Northwestern Bank of
Great Falls,' e the court held it was proper for the district court to
instruct the jury to consider recovery under the tort principles in
accordance with the rationale of the Twombly case. 8 0 In Tribby,
the bank allegedly wrongfully honored checks drawn on a partner-
173. Twombly, - Mont. at - , 689 P.2d at 1270. Other courts have also held that
breaches of good faith provisions of U.C.C. §§ 1-203 and 1-208 may result in tort damages.
See Nobs Chemical, U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co., 616 F.2d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 1980); Interco,
Inc. v. First National Bank, 560 F.2d 480, 485 (1st Cir. 1977); Allied Canners & Packers, Inc.
v. Victor Packing Co., 162 Cal. App. 3d 905, 914, 209 Cal. Rptr. 60, 65 (1984); Hall v. Owen
County State Bank, 175 Ind. App. 150, 172, 370 N.E.2d 918, 927 (1977); Rigby Corp. v.
Boatmen's Bank and Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Waters v. Trenckman,
503 P.2d 1187, 1191 (Wyo. 1972). See Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. 335 F.2d 846
(3d Cir. 1964); McKay v. Farmers & Stockmens Bank, 92 N.M. 181, 585 P.2d 325 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 92 N.M. 79, 582 P.2d 1292 (1978). The bulk of the decisions, however, have
rejected the position that a breach of U.C.C. §§ 1-203 and 1-208 give rise to a tort action.
174. 713 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). Other courts have also rejected the tort of
bad faith in farmer/lender disputes. See, e.g., North Cent. Kan. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Han-
sen, - Kan. - , - , 732 P.2d 726, 731 (1987).
175. Rigby Corp., 713 S.W.2d at 536.
176. Id.
177. In this case, MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1985) provides for an award of puni-
tive damages where malice, oppression, or fraud are shown.
178. Twombly, - Mont. at - , 689 P.2d at 1230.
179. - Mont. -, 704 P.2d 409 (1985).
180. Id. at - , 704 P.2d at 419.
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ship's land account. When the customer sued the bank, the bank
allegedly retaliated by refusing to renew a loan that had been re-
newed annually for several years and by refusing to make auto-
matic loan advances. The court, in holding that it was proper to
give the instruction, noted that the bank stood "in the position of
superior bargaining power" and that there was evidence of "reck-
less disregard" for the borrower's rights.'8 ' The court cautioned
"[wie are not holding that every contract or statutorily imposed
obligation, alone, carries with it an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, the breach of which permits recovery in tort."18
In Twombly and Tribby,183 the Montana Supreme Court de-
scribed when refusals to extend or renew credit amount to tortious
conduct, and in First National Montana Bank of Missoula v.
McGuiness, 8"' and Central Bank of Montana v. Eystad,185 the
court described when refusals to extend credit are not tortious con-
duct. In McGuiness, the borrowers alleged that the bank had
falsely led them to believe that it would not foreclose if they subdi-
vided their ranch. The bank, the court found, applied "subtle pres-
sure" to use the services of a real estate developer who was also the
nephew of an officer and director of the bank.'86 The subdivision of
the land did not result in sufficient proceeds to avoid foreclo-
sure. 1 7 The lower court found that the bank had not violated its
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the Montana Supreme
Court agreed. The supreme court found that subdivision of the
land resulted in sizable reduction in the amount of the debt. The
court held that the position taken by the bank "can hardly be
characterized as anything but good business sense both for the
bank and for the McGuinesses.' 8 8 The court properly found that
the bank was not liable for its suggested course of action, subdivi-
sion of the land, even though the bank's recommendation did not
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. In addition to Twombly and Tribby, the borrower was also successful with a bad
faith cause of action in Thiel v. Johnson, - Mont.__, 711 P.2d 829 (1985). In that case
the Thiels entered into a contract to sell a motel. After waiving defaults for four months, the
Thiels suddenly, without notice, declared a default and repossessed the premises. The fact
that the Thiels did so in accordance with a court order did not excuse Thiels' conduct be-
cause they obtained the court order improperly. Id. at -, 711 P.2d at 831.
184. - Mont. -, 705 P.2d 579 (1985).
185. - Mont. -, 710 P.2d 710 (1985).
186. The subtle pressure included a letter from the bank expressing displeasure about
the borrower's inability to consumate a deal with the nephew. McGuiness, - Mont. at
- 705 P.2d at 581.
187. Id. at 582.
188. Id. at -, 705 P.2d at 585-86.
1987]
41
Bahls: Termination of Credit for the Farm or Ranch: Theories of Lender Liability
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1987
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
produce sufficient income to fully pay the loan."5 9
In Eystad, the court dealt with an operating loan which had
been renewed for several six-month periods, prior to nonrenewal
and foreclosure. The borrowers alleged that the bank had engaged
in the "practice and course of conduct" of renewing the loans and
that the bank had changed this business practice without adequate
notice. 9 ° The borrower further alleged this practice constituted
the tort of bad faith. The supreme court affirmed the district
court's judgment that the bank did not breach any implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. The court specifically noted
that the bank acted "with justifiable business judgment in fore-
closing"19' and that the bank was "candid and reasonable" with
the borrower because they repeatedly gave the borrowers notice
that the loan would not be renewed. 92 Like McGuiness, the court
focused on whether the judgment of the bank was reasonable. 19
The line between when the lender meets the reasonable expec-
tation of the borrower and when it does not has not been clearly
delineated by the Montana Supreme Court.'9 ' Unfortunately, be-
cause the law concerning breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is only now evolving, there is little guidance
from other courts as to what conduct is reasonable and what is not.
A good elaboration of when bank conduct is unreasonable and
when a bank is culpable for a bad faith refusal to extend credit
may be found in K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 95 In K.M.C.
Co., the bank refused to extend additional credit to the borrower.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of bad faith.
Among the factors noted by the court, as evidence of bad faith,
189. Id. at -, 705 P.2d at 586.
190. Eystad, - Mont. at -, 710 P.2d at 712-13.
191. Id. at -, 710 P.2d at 713 (emphasis added).
192. Id. at -, 710 P.2d at 714.
193. The standard of business judgment was discussed in Dunfee v. Baskin-Robbins,
Inc., - Mont. -, 720 P.2d 1148 (1986) without the business judgment label being ap-
plied. The court, when dealing with Baskin-Robbins' refusal to change the terms of a lease,
stated that it "recognized the contractual right of Baskin-Robbins to refuse relocation on
the basis of cost or other economic circumstances." The court was critical of Baskin-Robbins
because the only person at Baskin-Robbins who could approve of the move was not told of
the relocation request. One would expect, however, that the employees of Baskin-Robbins
were only following the normal business practice of screening relocation requests prior to
submitting a select group to the employee with the ultimate authority. Burnham, Bad
Faith: Court Finds Breaches of Fair Dealing Applicable to Commercial Contracts, THE
MONTANA LAWYER, Nov. 1986 at 6, 9 ("Bad business judgment alone should not constitute
the kind of unreasonable conduct that is actionable as bad faith in a commercial setting.").
194. Likewise, 1987 Mont. Laws - (House Bill 592) does nothing to define what
conduct is reasonable or what conduct is not.
195. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
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(1) a personality conflict between the loan officer and a man-
ager of the borrower;'9 6
(2) the loan officer's conduct violated a policy of the bank; 7
(3) "any reasonable banker looking at the loan would agree
that it was fully secured"; 98 and,
(4) failure to give reasonable notice that credit would be ter-
minated and the bank's knowledge of that termination would
"destroy" the borrower.' 9
The court adopted a "business judgment" standard when mea-
suring the conduct of the bank. In discussing whether the bank
was liable, the court looked at more than the actual mental state of
the officers of the bank. The court stated:
While it is not necessary that [a bank officer] have been correct in
his understanding of the facts and circumstances pertinent to his
decision not to advance funds for this court to find that he made
a valid business judgment in doing so, there must at least be some
objective basis upon which a reasonable loan officer in the exer-
cise of his discretion would have acted in that manner.2 0 0
The business judgment standard described in K.M.C. Co. was
alluded to in the Montana cases of McGuiness and Eystad. °' In
both cases, the Montana Supreme Court acknowledged that where
the bank exercised "good business sense" or "justifiable business
judgment," the claim for a breach of the implied covenant should
fail. By using the words "good" and "justifiable" to modify the
words "business" and "business judgment," one may assume courts
in states which recognize the covenant would examine more than
the mental state of the bank officer, but would examine the record
to determine whether there is some objective basis for the officer's
decision.2"2 The justifiable business judgment standard, of course,
196. Id. at 761.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 761-62.
199. Id. at 762. "If [the lender] had given K.M.C. 30 days, 7 days, even 48 hours no-
tice, we would be facing a different case." Id. at 763.
200. Id. at 761 (emphasis in original). A Missouri Court of Appeals has distinguished a
case involving a demand note from the line of credit in K.M.C. Co., because K.M.C. Co.
dealt with the failure to extend credit "suddenly and without notice." Id. at 48. In Centerre
Bank, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, the court stated that the duty of good faith and U.C.C. § 1-203
should not apply to demand notes. Demand notes are due when called, for whatever reason;
the U.C.C. should not be used to add other terms to a demand note. Id. at 47, 48. See also
Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 10 Wash. App. 530, 518 P.2d
734, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 967 (1974).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 184-93.
202. Likewise 1987 Mont. Laws - (House Bill 592) requires the courts to use an
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should be applied in such a way as to protect the borrower's rea-
sonable expectations while preserving the bank's ability to protect
its capital and provide a return to shareholders.
The California Supreme Court in Wagner v. Benson 0 3 offered
a sound rationale for respecting a bank's interest in protecting its
collateral and the ability to operate profitably. The court acknowl-
edged that the law of torts, including a bad faith cause of action,
must achieve a desirable social climate and that " 'public policy'
plays a major role in determining the standard of conduct required
by a particular situation."2"4 The court found that public policy
did not require a bank to assume liability for hardships which be-
fall the borrowers. To do so would "dramatically alter the risk un-
dertaken by the bank in the loan agreement." ' The court cor-
rectly recognized that the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing required the bank to ensure that the borrower had the ben-
efit of the bargain, but not to ensure the success of the borrower." 6
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that courts have diffi-
culty dealing with the wide variety of theories asserted by a bor-
rower as a result of an unexpected termination of credit. Some
judges and juries are naturally sympathetic with the farmers and
other businesses which have expanded with money borrowed from
lenders and have faced a relatively sudden termination of credit,
usually due to factors beyond their control.20 7 Courts in most re-
ported cases, have rejected borrower claims that a contract existed
to extend credit. Courts hesitate to find that lenders assent to an
agreement unless the agreements are sufficiently definite to
amount to an enforceable contract. If courts believe the lender
conduct is sufficiently culpable to require a finding of liability, they
have usually relied on tort theories to do so. Because tort law bal-
ances competing public policy concerns, those concerns must be
objective standard.
203. 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1980). At the time this case was decided
the California court had not decided that a bad faith action could arise from a borrower-
lender relationship, so its analysis is arguendo.
204. 101 Cal. App. 3d at 34, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 520 (citing W. PROSSER, TORTS § 3, at 15-
16 (4th ed. 1971)).
205. Id. at 34, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
206. Id.
207. According to A. Barry Cappello, California plaintiffs' attorney, who represents
disgruntled borrowers, ". . . jurors typically perceive the farmer-banker relationship as
David against Goliath and, as a result, routinely award large verdicts to punish banks for
what they think is malicious or outrageous conduct." Cappello, One Farmer's Resolution,
WESTERN BANKER 24 (May 1986).
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A. The Need to Limit the Duty of the Bank to Act Reasonably
Courts should avoid the temptation to hold lenders liable for
borrowers' losses any time a trier of fact believes the conduct of
the bank is "unfair."' 8 In addition, instances in which the lender's
judgment should be tested against the objective reasonable busi-
ness judgment standard of the K.M.C. Co., Inc. case (and alluded
to in Eystad and McGuiness) should be limited to circumstances
in which the borrower has a reasonable expectation 20 9 that the
credit decisions will be made in good faith, or the lender has un-
dertaken a duty"' to act reasonably with respect to a credit deter-
mination. For example, if a loan is in default because of a failure to
pay an installment when due or a note is past due, the borrower
has breached its contract with the lender and should not expect to
hold the lender to an objective reasonable banker standard when
the lender evaluates whether the collateral is sufficient to extend
new credit. The borrower, in essence, is applying for new credit
and is not operating under the old loan agreements. The most the
borrower who has breached the contract to repay the lender is en-
titled to expect, absent extraordinary circumstances, is that the
lender commence collection action.21' Although a borrower may
not reasonably expect a lender to extend a new loan after the ex-
isting loan is in default, it may expect the lender to act in good
faith under the old loan, by giving timely notice of nonrenewal if
208. The problem with courts succumbing to pressures to attempt to solve the farm
crisis were accurately described by a Minnesota bankruptcy judge:
[I]t is crucial that the Bankruptcy Courts, as trial courts, do not succumb to the
temptation, which invariably arises from the more distressed cases, to fashion po-
litical solutions to general economic problems under the guise of administering
proper judicial remedies. Otherwise, the integrity of the Bankruptcy Courts, and
the judicial process itself, will become seriously eroded to the point where chaos
and cynicism will replace calm and reason; ultimately rendering the fabric of law
and destroying the credibility of the courts.
In re Haukos Farms, Inc., 68 Bankr. 428, 437 (1986).
209. The reasonable expectation should be the one described in Nicholson v. United
Pac. Ins. Co., - Mont. , ,710 P.2d 1342, 1348 (1985). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 168-69.
210. Whether a bank has undertaken a duty to act reasonably is discussed in Jacques,
307 Md. at 527, 515 A.2d at 756. See supra text accompanying notes 134-47.
211. The results should be the same under 1987 Mont. Laws - (House Bill 592). If
there is a default in the loan, it would appear to be commercially reasonable for the lender
to commence collection actions. Even the lesser subjective standard of U.C.C. § 1-203, hon-
esty in fact (U.C.C. § 1-201(19)), does not apply to decisions for new credit unless there is a
duty. The U.C.C. duty applies to "contracts," but not a party's consideration whether to
enter into new contracts.
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there has been a pattern of renewals or if the borrower has been
lead to believe the loan would be renewed.
To measure the lender's decision not to extend new credit af-
ter a loan is due and in default against an objective reasonableness
standard would place an undue burden on the lenders. While a
lender must objectively act in good faith under the terms of an
existing loan, the requirement to act in good faith when making a
new loan after the existing loan is due would place a burden on the
lender by making it difficult to terminate credit. Thus, a lender's
decision not to extend new credit, from an objective standpoint,
may not have been commercially reasonable, but, from a more sub-
jective standpoint, may have been made by the officer of the lender
based on his or her fear that the bank's position is jeopardized. For
example, a farmer may be required to pledge land to the lender
originally worth $500,000.00 to secure a $300,000.00 loan. Suppose
the land declines in value to $400,000.00 and the loan is due. As-
sume further that land prices have stopped falling and the bank's
$100,000.00 "cushion" is unlikely to shrink. The lender's officers
may, in subjective good faith, be more concerned about the loan
now than when it was originally made. If the bank officers have
any doubt about the borrower's ability to make timely payments
on the loan, they ought to be able to decline extending any further
or increased credit without incurring tort liability because they fail
to meet an objective standard of good faith. Further, if a second
farmer is able to offer $600,000 in collateral to support the same
$300,000 loan, the lender ought to be able to collect from the first
farmer and offer the loan funds to the farmer who is the better
credit risk. Only then will the lender be able to realize the benefits
which it expected when it originally bargained for the loan.
Several arguments can be made for the proposition that the
objective standard of good faith should not be extended to deci-
sions to offer further credit. 12 Those reasons include the need to
avoid restricting available lender credit and the inappropriateness
of any application of the deep pocket theory to transfer liability to
lenders.
1. Unnecessary Restriction of Credit
As in any other business, lenders make decisions based on the
relative amount of risk and reward. Because the amount of a
lender's reward (rate of interest) is limited by law (usury statutes),
212. For the purposes of this article the term "further credit" means new credit, an
extension of the due date of the loan, or additional credit.
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lenders are hesitant to make loans unless the amount of risk can be
controlled. Risks entail the possibilities of failure of the farm, de-
cline in value or dissipation of the collateral, bankruptcy of the
farmer; but should not include excessive risks of lawsuit if the
lender denies further credit after the loan is due. In those cases
where the risks associated with extending credit are nearly equal to
the rewards, additional risk such as a substantial expansion of the
theory of lender liability will tip the balance against extending
credit to farmers or other borrowers if the lender believes they are
litigious.21 If the balance is tipped in that direction, the marginal
borrowers who need credit the most may be excluded from credit
markets.
In addition to restricting availability of credit, shifting more
losses to lenders will result in higher interest rates for those who
are able to get credit. Although some of the losses due to lender
liability may be initially transferred to shareholders, those losses
will make it more difficult for lenders to attract funds to lend.21' In
order to attract funds, loan terms often are made harsher.
The problem of discouraging private lenders from extending
credit to the farm markets is particularly acute. Several major
banks are already making efforts to reduce the amount of lending
to farm and ranch businesses.1 5 Top government banking officials
have urged agricultural lenders to increase the diversification of
their borrower base-presumably away from agribusiness."' Farm
banks, already weakened by the farm economy,"' are often not
213. The author recently has heard several representatives of agribusiness suggest that
the enactment of Chapter 12, Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act, which provides for debt relief
for farmers faced with bankruptcy, has had the effect of further restricting the availability
of farm credit, especially to farmers whose operations are not highly profitable. Empirical
studies are needed to confirm the author's suspicions that these reports are accurate. The
author, however, is not alone in being concerned about the restrictions on the availability of
farm credit. After discussing a court decision which placed more risk on bankers as well as
new bankruptcy law changes and agricultural loan changes, it was concluded that agricul-
ture credit may dry up for farmers with weaker financial conditions. Cade, Around the Big
Sky Country at 3 (January 1, 1987) (quoting Robert Ranger, Chairperson of the American
Bankers Association, Agricultural Division). See also, Allen, Saving the Family Farm, 7
CAL. LAW. 8 (March 1987).
214. U.S. Dep't of Agric., How Healthy Are Rural Banks, FARMLINE, August 1986 at
10-11. For a discussion of the impact of Farm Credit System Losses, see U.S. Dep't of
Agric., The Farm Credit System: Troubled Past, Uncertain Future, May 1986 at 23, 27.
215. S. Lehrman, Financially Ailing Farmers Take Their Battle to the Courtroom,
San Francisco Examiner, March 19, 1986, at A-4, col. 3.
216. Statement of Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency Before the Commit-
tee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate (March 11, 1986) at page
17.
217. In 1985, 68 farm banks failed. The number of farm banks in serious financial
trouble "has risen substantially." Farm Credit Administration Act Amendments of 1985,
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anxious to make more of the agriculture loans which created,21 for
many of them, serious problems of survival.
2. Liability for Farm Credit Problems Ought Not Be Shifted to
Lenders
When a borrower faces losses and sues, alleging a tort theory,
because the lender terminates credit, courts may legitimately ex-
amine public policy to determine allocation of liability and the
proper standard of conduct. 19 An expansion of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing to the lender's decision to ex-
tend further credit after a borrower's default would shift greater
burden for the farm credit crisis to lenders. The temptation to
make this shift should be avoided. Public policy does not, and has
never, imposed upon the lender liability for the hardships suffered
by the businesses it finances.22 The risk that the lender under-
takes is that its collateral will not support the loan. Banks attempt
to minimize the risk by including the appropriate terms in its loan
documents, including a definite due date. Novel theories which
seek to alter the benefits for which the lender bargained have been
rejected221 and should continue to be rejected. The risks associated
with farming and the profitability of farming operations, of course,
are best controlled by farmers who make the decisions on types of
crops or livestock to raise and who have the power to determine
whether commodity prices are so low that nothing should be
raised. The costs of incorrect decisions, whether or not the deci-
sions were warranted at the time, should be borne by those who
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess.
127 (1986) (statement by Preston Martin, Vice Chairman, Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System). One hundred sixty-two of the 861 national agriculture banks reported
losses at year end in 1984. As of December 1985, 12 percent of national agricultural banks
were considered "problem institutions" by the Comptroller of the Currency. Farm Credit
Administration Act Amendments of 1985 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, United States, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 111 (1986) (statement of Robert L.
Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency).
218. As of the fourth quarter of 1985, only 38% of the rural banks in the Ninth Fed-
eral Reserve District, which extends from Montana to the Upper Peninsula of Michigan,
were actively seeking new farm accounts. As of late 1986, that number has increased to 69%.
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Agricultural Credit Condition Survey 4 (4th Quarter
1986).
219. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 3 at 15-16 (4th ed. 1971). See also Wagner v. Benson, 101
Cal. App. 3d 27, 32, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 520 (1980).
220. See Wagner, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 34, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 520, Fox & Carskadon
Fin. Corp. v. San Francisco Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 52 Cal. App. 3d 484, 489, 125 Cal. Rptr.
549, 552 (1975).
221. See Wagner, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516; Universal Sales Corp. v.
Cal. Press Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 128 P.2d 665, (1942).
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have the greatest opportunity to control the risks, in most cases,
the borrowers.
It is easy to sympathize with the plight of the United States
farmer. The recent decline of the farm economy is due to factors
beyond the control of the farmer, including world recession, United
States trade policies (including the grain embargo of the Soviet
Union), and federal government farm programs which have re-
sulted in increased world production.2 22 The fact that many of the
farmers' financial problems were caused by policies of the federal
government, however, does not justify a shift in liability to the
banks. Banks, themselves, have also been victims of restrictive fed-
eral policies which have restricted their profitability. 2 3 If it is de-
termined that farmers ought to be provided a "safety net" in the
form of a continued source of assured credit, it is most efficient to
accomplish that objective through expanded use of such social wel-
fare programs as the Farmers Home Administration Limited Re-
source Eligibility Loan Program 224 or loan moratorium or deferral
programs on FmHA loans.2 2 It has long been recognized that so-
cial insurance programs may more efficiently allocate risks which
cannot or are not insured against, than the enterprises which are
partially responsible for the risk. Holding enterprises such as
banks or the Farm Credit System liable for these risks causes more
social disruption (bank failures 226 and injury to innocent share-
holders and uninsured depositors) than would social insurance.227
Social insurance programs, however, are not without their own
costs. Social insurance programs frequently fail to address the fun-
damental problem facing agriculture in the United States: high
222. See U.S. Dep't of Agric. Econ. Research Serv., Reviving U.S. Exports: Why is It
Taking So Long, FARMLINE, Feb. 1986 at 8-10. Senator Charles E. Grassley of Iowa recently
stated "most of the difficulties that farmers face, whether they be falling land values, high
interest rates, low commodity prices, the law of export markets, increased competition from
imports - practically all of those things can be attributed to ill-considered Government
policies." Farm Credit Administration Act Amendment of 1985 Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 8 (1986).
223. See Jewett & Lane, Averting the Next Crisis in Banking, THE BANKER'S MAGA-
ZINE, Jan-Feb 1986 at 29 and Fraser, Deregulation and Depository Institutions, THE
BANKER'S MAGAZINE, Jan-Feb 1983 at 34.
224. For a description of this program, see 7 C.F.R. § 1943.4(g) (1986). For a descrip-
tion of other farm loan programs, see Meyer & Wadley, Agricultural Law 1982 at 367-81.
225. See 7 U.S.C. § 1981(d) (1986).
226. If a rural bank fails, many of its borrowers in a weak financial condition are una-
ble to find new lenders. The FDIC is forced to foreclose and land values in the community
are driven down. Melcher, Agricultural Banks Under Stress, FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN,
July 1986, at 437.
227. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J., 499, 528-32 (1961).
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land prices and overproduction resulting in low market prices. So-
cial programs such as price supports or price floors encourage more
production overseas which, in the long run, result in further down-
ward pressure on farm profits."2 8 Likewise, if the social programs
take the form of subsidized federal credit, farm profit may further
erode because with more money being invested in farming, agricul-
tural output will increase. The result will be more erosion in farm
profitability."2 9
Making credit easier to obtain from traditional farm lenders
under the threat of legal action will have the same consequence as
subsidized federal credit. Shifting some of the farmers' losses to
the lenders will of course increase the profitability of farming, but
will also result in inflated land values. It is those inflated land
prices and the resultant borrowing against land values that is at
the root of problems of farmers with financial difficulty. While
most farmers, including those with financial difficulty, are generat-
ing an operating profit, they experience negative cash flow because
of high debt payments.2 3 0 Declining land prices, though painful to
the individual farmers with substantial debt, are needed in order
to restore international cost competitiveness to the entire farm sec-
tor. A policy which shifts losses to banks will impede this pro-
cess,2 31 and will jeopardize the entire farm economy. Social pro-
grams designed to help a relatively few in the short run could
jeopardize many more viable farms in the long run.
B. Application of the Duty to Act Reasonably to Tort Claims
As has been discussed, tort law attempts to allocate responsi-
bility for loss by balancing public policy considerations. The two
competing public policy considerations when credit is terminated
are the borrower's need for available sources of credit and the
lender's need to act quickly to minimize its losses. Borrowers have
a need for credit and a need to be given adequate notification
before credit is terminated. Adequate notice allows commercially
viable borrowers the opportunity to find replacement credit. Con-
sistent with the borrower's right to reasonable notice, lenders
228. See U.S. Dep't of Agric. Econ. Research Serv., Reviving U.S. Exports: Why Is It
Taking So Long?, FARMLINE, Feb. 1986 at 8-10.
229. See U.S. Dep't of Agric. Econ. Research Serv., Reassessing the Federal Role in
Farm Credit, FARMLINE, Feb. 1985 at 16-18.
230. See Melcher, Agricultural Banks Under Stress, FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN, July
1986, at 437, 440-41.
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ought to be able to make credit termination decisions in a way that
maximizes their profit. Lenders should not be forced to fear second
guessing with respect to credit decisions to either extend or refuse
to extend further credit by being held to an objective standard of
commercial reasonableness. 232 As recognized by the Montana Su-
preme Court, the implied covenant of good faith should not be in-
terpreted in such a way to discourage business from making neces-
sary decisions.2 3 Nonetheless, examination of whether lenders'
notice to the creditors and other statements and actions are rea-
sonable does not place as much a burden on the bank as scrutiny
of the lender's decision to extend further credit.
The lender's right to make a business decision respecting fur-
ther credit is not threatened by any of the tort theories described
except for the duty owed to process a loan without negligence and
the application of the implied covenant of good faith and dealing.
All other tort theories scrutinized how the credit decision is
presented to the borrower, which is less sensitive than scrutinizing
the actual credit decision itself.
1. Negligence in Processing a Loan Application
The case of Jacques v. First National Bank23 4 should be lim-
ited in its application to those cases where there is a formal loan
application and where the lender expressly undertakes a duty to
review the application against identifiable loan standards.2 35 The
theory of this case should not be expanded to enable courts to re-
view all credit determinations on the basis of whether the decisions
were commercially reasonable. Unless the bank specifically under-
takes to make a credit decision to extend a loan using reasonable
or identifiable standards, the bank ought to be protected from lia-
bility if it makes the decision to deny credit so long as its actions
do not give rise to a contract to extend credit or amount to some
type of fraud. The bank that solicits applications for new loans,
232. In a scathing criticism of the implication of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, the Texas Supreme Court stated: "The novel concept... [the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing] would abolish our system of government according to settled
rules of law and let each case be decided upon what might seem fair and in good faith by
each fact finder."
English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983). See also Cluck v. Frost Nat'l Bank of San
Antonio, 714 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
233. Dunfee v. Baskin-Robbins, - Mont. - , 720 P.2d 1148 (1986).
234. 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986). See supra text accompanying notes 134-44.
235. The Montana Supreme Court, for example, has been hesitant to find negligence
in administration of a loan. See First Nat'l Bank v. McGuiness, - Mont. 705
P.2d 579, 586 (1985).
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such as the bank in Jacques, should be different from the duty of
the bank that considers renewing credit to a borrower in default.
In the former case, it is reasonable for the borrower to expect cer-
tain standards to be followed and in the latter case it is only rea-
sonable for the borrower to expect that the lender will do what it
can legally do to get out of a bad situation, which is often used to
initiate a foreclosure action.
2. Tort of Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing
As discussed, the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing standard should be applied to the lender's actions. The extent
of the covenant should be measured by the justifiable expectations
of the parties. This section argues, however, that the implied cove-
nant should not be applied to the actual decision to extend further
credit to a delinquent borrower because the parties usually do not
expect the covenant to be applied. The Montana Supreme Court in
Nicholson v. United Pacific Insurance Co.2 36 held that the "im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is measured by the
justifiable expectations of the parties" and "if a party acts 'arbi-
trarily, capriciously or unreasonably,' that conduct exceeds the jus-
tifiable expectations of the second party" resulting in tort liabil-
ity.2 37 Shortly after the Nicholsen case was decided, the court
implied that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing would not
be implied in all contracts, but would be measured by the justifia-
ble expectation of the parties.238
It is proper to imply a "covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing" to certain aspects of the typical debtor-creditor situation, es-
pecially when the borrower is a farmer or other small businessper-
son.239 Banks have, as a whole, fostered an image of being "a bank
you can trust." If a lender is selected by a farmer or small busi-
nessperson because it is "reliable" and "trustworthy," then a cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing has to be inferred into the con-
tract between the lender and borrower. A further argument can be
made for inferring the covenant when there are elements of adhe-
236. - Mont. - , 710 P.2d 1342 (1985).
237. Id. at -, 710 P.2d at 1348.
238. Thiel v. Johnson, - Mont. - , 711 P.2d 829, 833 (1985) (".. an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not an obligation arising from a contract (The
writer hereof does not agree. .. I would imply the covenant in every contract)."). See also
Nicholson, - Mont. at - , 710 P.2d at 1347-48. Likewise, 1987 Mont. Laws __
(House Bill 592), which describes the conduct required by the implied covenant does not
mandate that the covenant is implied in all contracts.
239. Nicholson, - Mont. at -, 710 P.2d at 1347.
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sion or inequality. Farmers are frequently unable to negotiate most
of the terms of the promissory notes, although they are able to
dicker over such things as the amount of collateral. Likewise, al-
though farmers are usually sophisticated businesspersons when it
comes to raising and selling their product, they are not necessarily
sophisticated when it comes to negotiating for credit. Unlike large
businesses, farmers frequently do not retain legal counsel when ne-
gotiating or closing a loan and do not employ sophisticated chief
financial officers.
The nature and extent of the covenant in debtor/creditor con-
tracts must be determined by the justifiable expectations of the
parties.240 With respect to credit decisions, it is clearly not reasona-
ble to expect the lender to extend further credit if there is insuffi-
cient collateral to support the loan or if the lender doubts the
farmer's ability to repay the loan. Borrowers who are delinquent
with loan repayments ought not be able to claim that they reasona-
bly believed that the lender would extend a loan to undercollater-
alized debtors or debtors who are in default.
Borrowers can have no more justifiable expectation than to ex-
pect that the lender will make the credit decision in accordance
with its standards at the time the credit decision is to be made.
Because of the nature of lending standards, the standards should
not be measured against an objective reasonable lending standard.
Banks' lending standards are to a large extent controlled by state
and federal regulation,241 and by policies of corresponding lenders
and the Farm Credit System. 242 Since borrowers can expect noth-
ing more than for the lender to make credit decisions based on
their subjective belief as to whether or not the loan is a sound in-
vestment for the lender, with respect to the credit decision itself,
the decision to extend further credit is not best tested under an
objective good faith standard. Rather, the conduct should be mea-
sured by contract and fraud theories. 243 But, while the borrower
may not reasonably expect the credit decision to be made on any
240. The precise nature and extent of this covenant is not absolutely clear under Mon-
tana law. See Darko v. United States Dep't of Agric., 646 F. Supp. 223, 225 (D. Mont. 1986).
Some certainty, however, has been added by 1987 Mont. Laws _. The statute, however,
does not define precisely what commercially reasonable conduct is.
241. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 32-1-431 (1985) (limitations on real estate loans),
MONT. CODE ANN. § 32-1-432 (1985) (limitation on loans) and MONT. CODE ANN. § 32-1-455
(1985). (reserve requirements).
242. Small rural banks are frequently not able to make loans as large as the farmer
requires. Those banks establish a relationship with larger banks and the Farm Credit Sys-
tem. M. BOEHLJE & V. EIDMAN, FARM MANAGEMENT at 619 (1984).
243. For example, if the lender contracts to extend further credit or fraudulently rep-
resents the intent to do so.
1987]
53
Bahls: Termination of Credit for the Farm or Ranch: Theories of Lender Liability
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1987
266 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
other basis than the lender's belief about the soundness of the
loan, the borrower may reasonably expect that the decision will be
communicated and implemented in a reasonable, non-arbitrary
way. If a decision is made to sever credit, it is reasonable to expect
that the debtor will be notified within a reasonable time and, in
some cases, will be given a reasonable time to replace the credit
with credit from another source.
IV. CONCLUSION
When courts are asked to determine whether a lender is liable
for damages for an unexpected termination of credit, courts must
use care in analyzing a claim that does not fit neatly into any cause
of action. If the due date of a note has been fixed by agreement
and the loan is in default due to non-payment, lenders should not
be liable for making the business judgment, in good faith, to exer-
cise their collection rights under the agreement.
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